Search Results
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O. (E.M.) v. O. (W.R.),
2003 BCCA 191
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2003/03/27
Court of Appeal
Appeal from an order of the B.C. Supreme Court fixing child and spousal support and failing to re-apportion family assets. The appeal was allowed only to the extent of increasing child support because of an error in calculating the defendant's Guideline income and correcting a miscalculation of asset division as conceded by the defendant. Calculation of the plaintiff's Guideline income was also corrected although it made no difference to the amount of spousal support to be paid.
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O.C. v. M.V.S.G.,
2022 BCCA 140
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2022/04/14
Court of Appeal
This case involves an appeal and cross appeal. The appellant seeks to overturn a spousal support award on the ground that, in assessing the amount payable, the judge used an incorrect DivorceMate calculation. The appellant also challenges a costs order made against him when he applied to re open the trial to rectify the calculation error. The respondent’s cross appeal seeks reconsideration of the judge’s equal division of family property and family debt in the event this Court reduces the spousal support award.
Held: Appeal allowed and cross appeal allowed in part. The judge committed a palpable and overriding error in calculating periodic spousal support using a shared parenting range despite ordering primary parenting in favour of the respondent. The spousal support must be reduced, consistent with the correct range. Ordering costs against the appellant for his attempt to rectify that error before a final order had been entered was manifestly unjust.
The judge’s decision to award higher end spousal support to the respondent was intended, in part, to compensate for family funds that were appropriated by the appellant for his sole benefit post separation and the lack of retroactive child and spousal support. As the property division has been implemented, the appropriate remedy on the cross appeal is to quantify those amounts and order that the appellant compensate the respondent for them.
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O.E.X. Electromagnetic Inc. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission),
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1990/05/23
Court of Appeal
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O.E.X. Electromagnetic Inc. v. Coopers,
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1992/06/29
Court of Appeal
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O.E.X. Electromagnetic Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand,
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1993/09/29
Court of Appeal
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O.E.X. Electromagnetic Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand,
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1995/05/30
Court of Appeal
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O.E.X. Electromagnetic Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand,
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1995/05/30
Court of Appeal
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O.E.X. Electromagnetic Inc.(Re),
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1990/03/01
Court of Appeal
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O.K. Industries Ltd. v. District of Highlands,
2022 BCCA 12
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2022/01/13
Court of Appeal
The District of Highlands appeals orders declaring that certain bylaws are inapplicable to the respondent’s quarry operation, which was authorized by a permit granted under the Mines Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 293. It challenges the correctness of this court’s decision in Cowichan Valley (Regional District) v. Cobble Hill Holdings Ltd., 2016 BCCA 432. The District submits that the chambers judge erred in concluding that he was bound to follow Cobble Hill, which he interpreted to establish that the Province has exclusive jurisdiction over all activities authorized by a mines permit that fall within the definition of “mine” and “mining activity” under the Mines Act. The District also submits the chambers judge erred in applying a standard of correctness on the basis that this case involved the jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative tribunals.
Held: Appeal allowed in part. There is no basis for a three-justice division of this court to overrule Cobble Hill, as the Court conducted a considered analysis of the applicable statutory regimes and jurisprudence. The jurisdictional analysis in Cobble Hill was not premised on the concept of exclusivity but rather as a conclusion arising from its interpretation of the statutory regime, and it addressed only the municipal zoning power.
The standard of review in this case is correctness. Although it does not fit well into the categories described in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 as exceptions to the reasonableness standard, including the jurisdictional boundaries exception, it is one of the exceptional circumstances where the rule of law justifies a correctness review.
Cobble Hill decided that a municipal government is not empowered to regulate “mines”, which include quarries, under its zoning power. The chambers judge correctly determined that the District’s Official Community Plan and Zoning Bylaw No. 100, while valid, are not currently applicable in relation to OKI’s quarry operations.
As for the other bylaws in issue, the myriad of provincial legislation considered in Cobble Hill does not clearly evince an intention to usurp all municipal power to regulate other matters authorized under s. 8 of the Community Charter, S.B.C. 2003, c. 26. However, the broad legislative scheme in relation to mining establishes that the municipal authority is clearly circumscribed by the provincial interest, and the principles of municipal-provincial relations set out in s. 2 of the Community Charter require municipal governments to use their s. 8 powers to regulate only truly local impacts arising from aggregate operations that are not otherwise addressed in the conditions attached to a mines permit. Municipal authority does not extend to regulation that has a prohibitory effect on the operation of a quarry in respect of the activities authorized under a mines permit and the conditions under which they are to be carried out, and any bylaws that have such an effect will be inapplicable.
The appeal is allowed only to the extent that the declarations granted in respect of the soil removal and deposit, tree, blasting and building bylaws are set aside and replaced with declarations that reflect the narrower basis for inapplicability described above.
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O’Connell v. Mazilescu,
2011 BCCA 363
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2011/09/06
Court of Appeal
Reasons to follow on an application for leave to appeal an order refusing to set aside an Anton Pillar Order. The factors for granting leave on an interlocutory order weighed against granting the application. Accordingly, the application was refused.
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O’Connell v. Yung,
2012 BCCA 57
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2012/02/03
Court of Appeal
The appellant appealed from a Supreme Court order that awarded the respondent damages for severe injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Non-pecuniary damages, an in-trust award, and damages for cost of future care were at issue on the appeal. The appellants contended the trial judge erred in failing to draw adverse inferences and in her assessment of the evidence.
Appeal allowed in part. There was no basis to interfere with the awards for non-pecuniary damages; the in-trust award; or the rehabilitation component of the cost of future care. However, the trial judge erred in applying the principle from Kroeker v. Jansen, that the loss of capacity to do housework was appropriate whether or not replacement services would be hired, to the assessment of the cost of future personal care. Discussion of the different purposes of loss of housekeeping capacity and future care awards.
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O’Flanagan v. Rossland (City),
2009 BCCA 182
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2009/04/29
Court of Appeal
Appeal from refusal of a judge to quash a bylaw imposing a parcel tax on properties to pay for a portion of the funds required to build a water reservoir. Appellants argued that judge had erred in accepting that zoning densities were a factor that could be considered as relevant in defining the physical characteristics of properties to be taxed. Appellants also argued that decision of municipal council to exempt certain properties in area that had paid taxes for earlier improvements was unreasonable and ought not to be sustained.
Court of Appeal finding that judge did not err in his conclusion on zoning issue. Court of Appeal also holding that deference ought to be given to decision of municipal council concerning the exemption of certain properties from current tax liability. Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., 2000 SCC 13, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 342, referred to.
Appeal dismissed.
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Oak Bay Marina Ltd. v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission),
2002 BCCA 495
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2002/09/10
Court of Appeal
The complainant Mr. Gordy suffered from bi-polar disorder from the spring of 1995 but wished to be employed, as he had in previous summers, as a fishing guide in the waters around Campbell River, where the respondent "OBM" operated a fishing resort. Based on its observations of Mr. Gordy's condition in June 1995, OBM was found by the Human Rights Tribunal, to have refused to hire him by reason of his disability, contrary to then s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. The Tribunal found that OBM had improperly considered its observations of Mr. Gordy and had not proven a bona fide occupational requirement.On appeal to BCSC, the Chambers judge found the Tribunal had erred in so ruling, and quashed the finding of liability on the employer's part.
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Oak Bay Marina Ltd. v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal),
2001 BCCA 389
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2001/06/04
Court of Appeal
Application by Human Rights Commission for intervenor status denied, the Commission indicating it did not intend to raise grounds of appeal in addition to those being advanced by the appellant.
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Oak Bay Marina Ltd. v. Haida Nation,
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1995/11/07
Court of Appeal
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Oakey v. Lynott,
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1990/06/20
Court of Appeal
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Oberreiter v. Akmali,
2009 BCCA 557
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2009/12/09
Court of Appeal
A motion to review an order dismissing an application for leave to appeal is dismissed. The chambers judge correctly found there was no arguable or meritorious issue to the action or the practice that warranted the granting of leave to appeal from a mistrial order of the trial judge, from an irregularity discovered following the delivery of a verdict by a civil jury but before judgment was entered.
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O'Brian Financial Corp. v. Welch,
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1991/12/13
Court of Appeal
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O'Brien (Guardian of) v. Anderson,
2000 BCCA 460
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2000/08/29
Court of Appeal
Damages for personal injuries - appellants assert palpable or overriding error on findings of fact - correct test is palpable and overriding error - Toneguzzo-Norvell v. Burnaby Hospital, [1994], 1 S.C.R. 114, 121, Stein v. The Ship "Kathy K", [1976] 2 S.C.R. 802, 806-8 - future loss of income damages reduced as a matter of principle. Huddart J.A. dissenting on issue of quantum of damages for future loss of income. S. 55 Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 231 as amended - court ordering damages to be paid periodically - s. 55 operative as at time of judgment for damages.
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O'Brien v. Anderson,
2001 BCCA 641
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2001/10/25
Court of Appeal
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O'Brien v. O'Brien,
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1990/12/19
Court of Appeal
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O'Brien v. School District #39,
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1997/05/07
Court of Appeal
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O'Brien v. Simard,
2006 BCCA 410
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2006/09/08
Court of Appeal
Application for leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissed.
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O'Bryan v. O'Bryan,
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1997/10/02
Court of Appeal
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Ocean Beach Hotel v. British Columbia (General Manager of the Liquor Control and Licensing Branch),
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1991/03/01
Court of Appeal
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Ocean Pacific Hotels Ltd. v. British Columbia,
2006 BCCA 295
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2006/06/15
Court of Appeal
Statutory interpretation: On appeal from an order dismissing an appeal of a reassessment by the Minister of Public Revenue of the property tax payable by the assignee of two long-term prepaid commercial leases under property tax legislation, two issues arose. Both pertained to the interpretation to be given to regulatory provisions governing the determination of the fair market value of the taxable transaction for the purposes of the calculation of the tax payable. The interpretation given by the judge who heard the initial appeal was upheld and the further appeal dismissed.
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Ocean Park Ford Sales Ltd. v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia,
2016 BCCA 337
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2016/08/02
Court of Appeal
The respondent SCK, returned a leased vehicle to the lessor, Ocean Park. It then sold another vehicle to Ocean Park and leased it back. Later on the same day, the respondent, Linda Evans, driving the newly-leased vehicle with the consent of SCK, was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Evans, SCK and Ocean Park say ICBC and CDI insured them in relation to the use and operation of the newly-leased vehicle at the time of the accident. They made their claim pursuant to provisions of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 231 and the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation, B.C. Reg. 447/83, which afford coverage to the owner of a vehicle newly acquired as a substitute for a vehicle insured under an existing policy. The claim gives rise to a coverage issue because, while SCK no longer had an interest in the returned vehicle when the accident occurred, Ocean Park was still its registered owner and was in possession of the returned vehicle. The insurers say Ocean Park alone can be considered to be the owner of the returned vehicle and because it did not dispose of its interest in that insured vehicle it could not insure a “substitute” vehicle under the same certificate. The respondents applied for and were granted a declaration that they were entitled to insurance under both the ICBC policy and the CDI excess policy. The chambers judge held that when an owner acquires a substitute vehicle s. 52 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation extends coverage to that substitute vehicle for a period of 10 days from its acquisition, provided the conditions in subsections (a) - (c) are met; that the use of the term “owner” in s. 52 is not unqualified but refers to “an owner of the vehicle described in an owner’s certificate” and both SCK and Ocean Park were described as owners on the relevant owner’s certificate; that as a condition of coverage, s. 52(b) requires that the owner transfer “title to or interest in” the vehicle, suggesting that an interest less than full title can be transferred; that SCK complied with all three conditions in s. 52; and that the newly-leased vehicle was a substitute vehicle for the vehicle SCK had returned to the dealer.
HELD: Appeal allowed. Substitute vehicle coverage is available only to a person who has disposed of the ownership interest in a vehicle. The word “owner” as used in the applicable sections of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act and the Regulation does not encompass lessees. The explicit references to the lessee or renter in the statutory scheme demonstrate that the legislature intended to distinguish between owners and renters. The newly-leased vehicle was not acquired by an owner in substitution for the returned vehicle. The respondents are therefore not entitled to coverage pursuant to the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation.
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Ocean Pastures Corporation v. Old Masset Economic Development Corporation,
2016 BCCA 12
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2016/01/13
Court of Appeal
Appeal from orders dismissing the appellants’ applications for security for costs against an impecunious corporate plaintiff. The chambers judge found that the applicants satisfied the test for security for costs against the corporate plaintiff but declined to award security because an individual plaintiff was a shareholder of the corporate plaintiff. Held: appeal allowed. The chambers judge erred in applying the “special circumstances” test to the corporate plaintiff. The presence of an individual plaintiff does not alter the established test for security against a corporate plaintiff.
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Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control),
1999 BCCA 317
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1999/05/12
Court of Appeal
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Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control),
1999 BCCA 468
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1999/07/21
Court of Appeal
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Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (The General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch),
2002 BCCA 311
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2002/05/16
Court of Appeal
On a remit from the Supreme Court of Canada this Court decided: (1) there was no reasonable apprehension of bias when at a compliance hearing one senior inspector presented the evidence of alleged violations of the Act to another senior inspector who decided that the violations had occurred and imposed a 2 day suspension of the appellant's licence, as both were delegates of the General Manager of the Liquor Branch, who could have performed both functions himself; (2) even if there was a defect of natural justice at the compliance hearing, the de novo hearing conducted by the Liquor Appeal Board cured the defect; (3) all but one of the Board's findings were reasonably based on the evidence, and the Board did not err in relying on hearsay; (4) one of the violations was based on unreliable hearsay and the finding was set aside; and (5) the Act and Regulations cannot be interpreted as restricting the General Manager's power to delegate the conduct of compliance hearings to a senior inspector only when the licencee has first been convicted of an offence in Provincial Court. In the result, the case was remitted to the Board to reconsider the penalty in light of the reduced number of violations.
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Ocean Wise Conservation Association v. Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation,
2019 BCCA 58
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2019/02/19
Court of Appeal
The Park Board passed a by-law amendment to prohibit cetaceans being brought to or kept in city parks or the presentation of shows involving cetaceans in city parks. The respondent, the Vancouver Aquarium, commenced judicial review proceedings seeking to set aside the by-law amendment on four grounds, including the ground that it was ultra vires the Park Board because it was precluded by the licence agreement between the Aquarium and the Park Board. The chambers judge agreed that the licence agreement prevented the Park Board from applying the by-law to the Aquarium, and he declared the by-law amendment ultra vires and void to the extent it applied to the Aquarium. Held: Appeal allowed. The judge erred in concluding the Park Board could fetter its by-law making power in the licence agreement. A municipality cannot fetter its legislative powers unless there is legislation expressly authorizing it to do so, and the Vancouver Charter does not contain express authorization permitting the Park Board to fetter its by-law making power. The matter is remitted to the Supreme Court for determination of the Aquarium’s other three grounds challenging the by-law amendment.
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Ockey Developments Ltd. v. Suncoast Projects (2004) Ltd.,
2007 BCCA 105
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2007/02/15
Court of Appeal
Appeal allowed from order for specific performance (if the purchaser chose to close within 21 days) of sale of shares of company that owned certain real property. Purchaser had insisted on a certificate at closing that, on construction of the document, vendors were not required to provide and were not able to provide, regarding environmental status of the property. Time was of the essence and vendors had warned that it would regard any failure to close as repudiation of the agreement. Purchaser's failure to close disentitled it to specific performance. Shaw Industries v. Greenland Enterprises (1991) 54 B.C.L.R. (2d) 264 distinguished.
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O'Connell Electric Ltd. v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority,
2007 BCCA 58
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2007/02/01
Court of Appeal
Application for leave to appeal order for special costs dismissed.
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O'Connell v. McIndoe,
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1998/10/01
Court of Appeal
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Ocsko v. Cypress Bowl Recreations Ltd.,
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1992/09/14
Court of Appeal
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Oddguys Holdings Ltd. v. S.C.Y. Chow Enterprises Co. Ltd.,
2010 BCCA 176
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2010/04/07
Court of Appeal
An agreement allowed the owner of Oddguys’ lot to build a wall in part on property now owned by Chow, but reserved a right for the neighbour to build using the encroaching structure as a party wall upon payment proportionate to the section of wall used. If this right was exercised, costs of repairs to the party wall were to be shared. The agreement was registered against title for each lot, and some time ago a building was constructed using the wall. In 2004 a fire destroyed Chow’s building, and since then it has not built using the wall. Oddguys incurred significant costs repairing the fire-damaged wall. At trial Oddguys unsuccessfully sought contribution from Chow for the cost of repairs. Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge made no error in finding that the language of the agreement did not support a claim for contribution to repairs made when the wall was not being used by both parties. Should the owner of Chow’s lot choose to use any portion of the wall in the future, it will be obliged to make proportionate payment. Chow did not benefit from the repairs to the wall in a manner that triggered an obligation to pay.
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Oddguys Holdings Ltd. v. S.C.Y. Chow Enterprises Co. Ltd.,
2010 BCCA 176
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2010/04/07
Court of Appeal
An agreement allowed the owner of Oddguys’ lot to build a wall in part on property now owned by Chow, but reserved a right for the neighbour to build using the encroaching structure as a party wall upon payment proportionate to the section of wall used. If this right was exercised, costs of repairs to the party wall were to be shared. The agreement was registered against title for each lot, and some time ago a building was constructed using the wall. In 2004 a fire destroyed Chow’s building, and since then it has not built using the wall. Oddguys incurred significant costs repairing the fire-damaged wall. At trial Oddguys unsuccessfully sought contribution from Chow for the cost of repairs. Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge made no error in finding that the language of the agreement did not support a claim for contribution to repairs made when the wall was not being used by both parties. Should the owner of Chow’s lot choose to use any portion of the wall in the future, it will be obliged to make proportionate payment. Chow did not benefit from the repairs to the wall in a manner that triggered an obligation to pay.
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Oddou v. Mpega,
2021 BCCA 258
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2021/06/23
Court of Appeal
The respondent moved to British Columbia from Quebec to accommodate the appellant’s employment as an RCMP officer. Following the breakdown of their relationship, the respondent’s limited English language skills made it difficult for her to achieve financial self sufficiency. An initial support order from 2017 was to be reviewed in 2019. The appellant appeals from the result of that review, which took place in 2020. Both orders imputed full-time minimum wage employment to the respondent. The appellant argues the judge erred in misapplying the legal test for review of support orders and misapprehending the evidence. Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge carefully considered the relevant legal factors, and it is not for this Court to reweigh them. The judge did not misapprehend the evidence.
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Oddy v. Waterway Partnership Equities Inc.,
2019 BCCA 185
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2019/05/21
Court of Appeal
Ms. Oddy appeals the order dismissing her negligence action against Waterway for injuries she suffered when a mooring rope, embedded in a beach with a stake and attached to a houseboat, broke free, catapulted back towards the houseboat, and struck Ms. Oddy. The principal issue at trial was whether the defendant, Waterway, breached the standard of care owed to Ms. Oddy in the selection of a particular type of rope used to moor houseboats on Shuswap Lake. Ms. Oddy appeals on the grounds that the judge erred in not addressing an argument that the Marine Liability Act, S.C. 2001, c. 6 creates a presumption of negligence against Waterway that it had not displaced; the judge erred in the remoteness of damages analysis; and the judge made a number of palpable and overriding errors of fact. Held: appeal dismissed. The judge found as a fact that Waterway satisfied the standard of care. This finding does not rest on a palpable and overriding error and neither relies on nor is affected by the burden of proof. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to comment on whether the application of the Marine Liability Act and remoteness of damage have any merit.
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Oei v. Hui,
2020 BCCA 214
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2020/07/24
Court of Appeal
The respondents (plaintiffs) alleged the appellants (defendants) had engaged in tortious abuse of process by commencing a prior action, with knowing falsity of the claims, to constrain the ability of the respondents to deal with or develop property and to induce or compel the respondents to continue negotiations with respect to the property. The appellants applied to strike the respondents’ amended notice of civil claim as disclosing no cause of action. The judge provided the elements of the tort of abuse of process as (1) a collateral and improper purpose, (2) an overt act, and (3) damages, but stated that on the authority of Smith v. Rusk, 2009 BCCA 96, the generally applied element of an overt act may not be required in British Columbia. The judge held it was not “plain and obvious” the abuse of process action could not succeed. On appeal, the appellants contend the judge erred in holding that a plea of “knowing falsity” may be actionable absent a collateral purpose, that is, one outside the ambit of the litigation, and submit an overt act is a requirement of the tort.
Held: Appeal allowed. A plea of “knowing falsity” cannot transform purposes within the ambit of the litigation into tortious purposes in respect of the tort of abuse of process. This conclusion is affirmed by the doctrine of absolute privilege. On the issue of an overt act, the expression of doubt concerning this element in British Columbia rests on shaky ground; absent a reasoned basis to diverge from the law first stated in British Columbia, an overt act is required for the tort. The order is set aside and the application is remitted to the Supreme Court of British Columbia for fresh consideration.
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Office & Professional Employees' International Union v. B.C. (The Labour Relations Board of),
2001 BCCA 433
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2001/06/21
Court of Appeal
The Court restored an order of the Labour Relations Board interpreting s. 68(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Code.
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Ogden v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce,
2015 BCCA 175
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2015/04/27
Court of Appeal
CIBC appeals from a judgment finding it wrongfully terminated the employment of Ms. Ogden, a financial advisor. Ms. Ogden had agreed to an urgent request from one of her clients to permit the client to deposit funds from China into Ms. Ogden’s personal accounts. CIBC discovered this “commingling” of a client’s funds with her personal accounts in October 2010. On March 15, 2011, at the conclusion of its investigation into the transaction, CIBC terminated her employment for cause. Ms. Ogden sued CIBC for wrongful dismissal, asserting that a single error in judgment, as she says this was, did not suffice to terminate her employment. The trial judge agreed. He found that Ms. Ogden had been wrongfully dismissed and that she was entitled to damages, including aggravated damages. Held: The judge erred in three ways: 1) he misapprehended the legal argument and basis upon which CIBC advanced its defence. CIBC had argued that earlier incidents were relevant context, but the wire transfer standing alone was the basis for terminating Ms. Ogden’s employment. CIBC did not allege cumulative cause in the sense used by the judge. The judge misconstrued the basis of CIBC’s defence resulting in an error of law such that the judge’s overall conclusion cannot stand in the face of it; 2) the judge also drew inferences of fact in his reasons in respect to punitive damages that were irreconcilable with his findings of fact in respect to aggravated damages. This conflict casts doubt on his finding that the bank was liable for aggravated damages; and 3) the judge also misapprehended the evidence concerning the question of whether the wire transfer was a breach of CIBC’s employee Code of Conduct. This misapprehension of the evidence casts doubt on the judge’s overall conclusion that Ms. Ogden was wrongfully dismissed. The Court found it unnecessary to deal with CIBC’s argument that the judge’s extensive copying of Ms. Ogden’s counsel’s written submission was a procedural fairness issue and should lead to a new trial. A new trial was ordered.
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Ogilvie v. Ogilvie,
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1995/10/18
Court of Appeal
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Ogilvie v. Ogilvie Estate,
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1998/04/01
Court of Appeal
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Oh v. Coquitlam (City),
2018 BCCA 129
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2018/03/29
Court of Appeal
Mr. Oh’s claim was struck on the basis that it disclosed no cause of action, pursuant to R. 9-5(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, after the chambers judge considered evidence to reach this conclusion. Held: appeal allowed; order dismissing claim set aside. Evidence is not admissible on an application to strike a claim as disclosing no cause of action.
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Oh v. Kim,
2012 BCCA 369
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2012/09/18
Court of Appeal
The application was made to dismiss an appeal, label the appellant as a vexatious litigant, and award special costs. The application followed a long series of actions in which the appellant had unsuccessfully attempted to sue a newspaper. After having that case dismissed, the appellant launched an action against the newspaper’s counsel, alleging fraud, perjury, and destruction of evidence, among other things. None of the claims were substantiated, and were dismissed by Justice Grist in chambers. The appellant filed a notice of appeal from that order, but failed to do so within the time requirements under the Court of Appeal Act. She also failed to file an Appeal Record and Factum as required by the Rules. None of her submissions substantiated the allegations of fraud, perjury, or destruction of evidence.
HELD: The appeal was dismissed. The appeal was without merit. It could be treated as abandoned under the Court of Appeal Act for failure to comply with the Act and Rules. The appellant was labeled a vexatious litigant. Finally, special costs were awarded in the sum of $5000.
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Oh v. Langley (City),
2017 BCCA 43
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2017/01/23
Court of Appeal
The court below did not err in finding the appellant’s petition, which effectively sought a recount of votes cast in a municipal by-election, was out of time and that a case was not made out. Appeal dismissed.
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Oh v. Usher,
2013 BCCA 104
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2013/02/28
Court of Appeal
Ms. Oh sought to vary an order refusing to stay an earlier order to sell certain property she owned to satisfy judgments against her.
Held: Appeal denied. Ms. Oh has not demonstrated any error in the order appealed from.
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Oh v. Usher,
2013 BCCA 199
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2013/04/25
Court of Appeal
Ms. Oh appeals an order made by a judge dismissing the action against both the defendant Ron Usher and the defendant Stadium Homes Ltd. As well, the plaintiff was ordered to pay special costs in the amount of $10,000 to each of the defendants. The basis upon which this action was dismissed was that the matter was res judicata and consisted of a collateral attack on a previous decision in which her claim was dismissed by Cullen J. (as he then was).
Appeal dismissed
From a review of the allegations made in the claim under appeal compared to the earlier action that was dismissed by Cullen J., it is clear Ms. Oh’s claim and the second appeal are res judicata and constitute a collateral attack on Cullen J.’s order in the first action. Ms. Oh did not identify any error in the reasons for judgment of Watchuk J.
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