Search Results
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H & W Investments Ltd. v. George,
2018 BCCA 67
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2018/02/23
Court of Appeal
Application to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal dismissed.
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H. (D.) v. British Columbia (Attorney General),
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1994/09/13
Court of Appeal
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H. (N.) v. M. (H.).,
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1998/02/04
Court of Appeal
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H. (T. J.) v. H. (C. C.),
2003 BCCA 277
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2003/05/12
Court of Appeal
This notice of appeal was filed after an application to file a notice of appeal, brought under a different case number, was dismissed. This appeal is declared abandoned under s. 28 of the Court of Appeal Act. An order is made under s. 29 of the Act requiring leave before this appellant commences other proceedings. The appellant is ordered to pay costs of the application forthwith. An application to fix his father with personal liability for the costs is dismissed.
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H. Coyne & Sons Ltd. v. Whitehorse (City),
2018 YKCA 11
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2018/07/16
Court of Appeal
The owner of subsurface mining rights under a property zoned for a residential subdivision sought declarations respecting ancillary implied rights of access to the surface. Those declarations challenged the applicability of restrictions under Yukon mining legislation to the mining rights in question, and the validity of local land use bylaws which permitted the subdivision and prohibited mining. The judge declined to declare that Yukon’s mining legislation was inapplicable or that the bylaws were invalid. Held: appeal dismissed. The judge was correct to conclude the land use bylaws validly prohibited the owner from using the surface to access its subsurface mining rights. Nor did the judge err in exercising his discretion to not grant declarations respecting the mining legislation or any rights the owner had at common law as the bylaws would prohibit the exercise of such rights in any event, and Yukon was not given notice of the proceedings.
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H. Meyer Construction Ltd. v. van Dokkumburg,
2006 BCCA 320
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2006/06/22
Court of Appeal
Application to commit appellant to prison for contempt of order commanding him to pay costs dismissed as moot, the costs having been paid.
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H.(A.) v. H.(D.S.),
2003 BCCA 361
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2003/06/18
Court of Appeal
Application for an order dismissing Ms. H.'s appeal from a judgment of divorce on the basis of her failure to comply with the appeal provisions of the Divorce Act and the Court of Appeal Act. Held: Application granted and appeal dismissed. The appellant had failed to appeal within the requisite time limits and there was no provision for an extension of time in these circumstances.
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H.(U.V.) v. H.(M.W.),
2008 BCCA 177
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2008/04/28
Court of Appeal
Appeal of child support order made against a stepfather pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines Regulation under the Family Relations Act, which essentially mirrors the federal Child Support Guidelines. Stepfather had been ordered to pay his 'table amount ' under the Guidelines while the natural father had been ordered to pay substantially less than his table amount, given that he had started a new family, relying in part on the stepfather's 'undertaking', made when he was living with the mother, to support the children. APPEAL ALLOWED: Section 5 of the Guidelines requires that when making order against stepparent, Court must consider the legal support obligation of any other parent - in this case, the natural father. Court below had not determined how much the natural father was actually paying, but was required to quantify his obligation before turning to the stepparent's obligation. Given the mandatory wording of, and case authority re, s. 3, that obligation could only be the table amount. Custodial parent - in this case, the mother - could not bypass the father's obligation and obtain the full amount of support needed by the children, from the stepfather. Court bound to consider the Guidelines, especially the children's needs and standard of living, in deciding what, if anything, stepparent should pay under s. 5. Stepfather ordered to supplement natural father's support in this case. Comments re the discretion given to court under s. 5. Court below had erred in considering the stepparent's previous 'undertaking', as it was not a factor referred to in the Guidelines or in s. 5. Court below had not erred in making a retroactive order after stepfather disobeyed an earlier order requiring him to advise mother of changes in his income. Stepfather argued on appeal that because he had not been notified that shared custody of the children had ceased some years ago, natural father should pay 'arrears' of support and if stepfather were also required to do so, mother would receive a 'windfall'. On review of the factors referred to by the SCC in DBS v. SRG (2006), Court of Appeal held the father should not be ordered to pay retroactive support. Court of Appeal also considered whether there should be retroactive adjustment or even 'refund' of amounts paid, pending appeal, by the stepfather pursuant to the order appealed from. Based on the children's interests, Court decided no such adjustment should now be made. New support order would apply from May 1, 2008.
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H.M.B. Holdings Limited v. Replay Resorts Inc.,
2018 BCCA 450
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2018/11/30
Court of Appeal
A successful appellant applies for costs of the interlocutory applications in the Supreme Court of British Columbia that were the subject of the appeal. Held: Costs of the interlocutory applications are remitted to the Supreme Court of British Columbia to be allocated in accordance with Rule 14-1(12) of the Supreme Court Rules.
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H.M.B. Holdings Limited v. Replay Resorts Inc.,
2018 BCCA 263
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2018/06/25
Court of Appeal
In an application to strike a civil claim for abuse of process, a chambers judge made a declaration that the plaintiff had waived solicitor-client privilege over matters relating to the dispute between the parties. The judge also refused to order cross-examination of the deponent on the application to strike. The plaintiff appealed. Held: Appeals allowed. The test the judge employed did not adequately protect solicitor-client privilege and she erred in her consideration of the application to cross-examine.
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H.M.B. Holdings Limited v. Replay Resorts Inc.,
2018 BCCA 8
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2018/01/03
Court of Appeal
The appellants apply for leave to appeal (if necessary) of an order declaring that solicitor-client privilege had been waived in two respects and ordering production of documents that had been covered by the waived privilege. They also apply for an extension of an interim stay of the order and a direction that the appeal be heard at the same time as another appeal. Held: applications granted. The tests for leave to appeal and a stay have been met. It is appropriate for the appeal to be heard at the same time as the other appeal.
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H.M.B. Holdings Limited v. Replay Resorts Inc.,
2021 BCCA 142
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2021/04/07
Court of Appeal
The appellant brings two appeals from the decision of the chambers judge allowing the respondents’ application to strike the appellant’s Notice of Civil Claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action, and as an abuse of process. The chambers judge also dismissed the appellant’s application to amend its Notice of Civil Claim to address the deficiencies alleged to exist in the original. The appellant submits that the judge failed to apply the correct legal test for an application to strike, misconstrued the requirements for a sufficient pleading, made impermissible findings of fact, misapplied the law, erred in his application of the law pertaining to the amendment of pleadings, erred in allowing the application on grounds not properly before him and erred in failing to give due consideration to the legal requirements of the doctrine of issue estoppel. Following the hearing before this Court, the respondents applied to re-open the matter to admit new evidence. Held: Appeals dismissed. The appellants failed to demonstrate a causal connection between the actions purportedly taken by the respondents, and the alleged damage and loss suffered by the appellants, and thus the claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. Given the conclusion on the merits of the appeal, there is no need to re open the appeal for the purpose of admitting new evidence.
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H.M.T.Q. for B.C., as represented by the Minister of Forests et al v. Tnasem Logging Ltd.,
2006 BCCA 546
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2006/12/06
Court of Appeal
Tnasem appeals from an order holding that a claim by the Province of British Columbia for forest fire control and suppression costs were subject to the six year limitation period rather than the two year limitation period contained in sections 3(5) and 3(2)(a) of the Limitation Act respectively. Tnasem argued that such a claim fell within section 3(2)(a) being for damages in respect of injury to property (standing timber), including economic loss arising from the injury (the costs of fire control and suppression). HELD: The injury to property in the case at bar cannot be elevated to any stature above de minimis and as such does not form the basis of the Province's claim. The claim is based on the allegation of negligence and the remedy sought is damages for the costs of fire control and suppression arising out of that negligence and not upon injury to property. The loss being claimed is "pure economic loss" and, as such is not "injury to property" within s. 3(2)(a) of the Limitation Act. The applicable limitation provision is therefore s. 3(5) which sets a basic limitation period of six years from the date the right to bring the action arose.
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H.M.T.Q. In Right Of The Province of British Columbia v. Ismail,
2007 BCCA 55
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2007/01/31
Court of Appeal
An order setting aside a judgment entered in default of appearance is an interlocutory order for purposes of appeal and leave is required. Donald Berman Enterprises Ltd. v. 365946 B.C. Ltd. (2000), 140 B.C.A.C. 77, 2000 BCCA 391 followed. Leave refused.
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H.M.T.Q. v. Pandher,
2006 BCCA 587
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2006/12/22
Court of Appeal
Yukon Judgments:
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H.M.T.Q. v. Waranuk,
2010 YKCA 5
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2010/07/22
Court of Appeal
Mr. Waranuk was self-represented at a trial for assault. During the trial, the judge ordered that he be assessed for fitness and whether he suffered from a mental disorder. The judge refused Mr. Waranuk’s request to consult with a lawyer. He was found fit to stand trial, but was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder and remanded to the Yukon Review Board. He successfully appealed this finding on the basis that s. 672.24 requires that a lawyer be appointed for an accused whose mental status is in question. The Crown appealed. HELD: Appeal dismissed. Section 672.24 mandates that counsel be appointed when there is an application for an assessment for fitness to stand trial or to assess an accused’s mental status to determine criminal responsibility.
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H.M.T.Q. v. Watson,
2006 BCCA 233
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2006/05/11
Court of Appeal
Leave to appeal denied in case of conviction on ten counts of failing to file income tax returns.
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H.S.S. v. S.H.D.,
2021 BCCA 151
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2021/04/09
Court of Appeal
The applicant, Mr. S., applies for leave to appeal interlocutory orders regarding disclosure and discovery processes in advance of a trial scheduled to begin in September 2021. Mr. S. submits that the “fresh determination” of two remitted issues at the September trial should be based only on the evidence available at the original trial in 2015. He seeks to appeal the judge’s order requiring the parties to exchange updated, post-2015 financial information and for other discovery processes, including additional examinations for discovery. Held: Application dismissed. Mr. S.’s grounds of appeal relate to issues arising from the judge’s reasons, not his order. The judge did not make any order specifying the appropriate valuation date for the fresh determination nor did he ultimately decide the scope of his jurisdiction on the remitted issues. Mr. S. intends to comply with the orders in any event. Until the judge makes an order deciding the issues raised in this application, it is not in the interests of justice to grant Mr. S. leave to appeal.
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H.S.S. v. S.H.D.,
2018 BCCA 199
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2018/05/22
Court of Appeal
Appeal and cross appeal from the portions of the order after trial reapportioning the property division set out in the parties’ marriage agreement and awarding spousal support to Ms. D. In her appeal, Ms. D. argues that the degree of property reapportionment was erroneously small, and that the spousal support award failed to provide adequate compensatory and needs-based support. In his cross appeal, Mr. S. argues the judge erred in ordering any reapportionment at all, as the marriage agreement did not operate unfairly and Ms. D.’s economic disadvantage could have been remedied through spousal support.
Held: appeal allowed; cross appeal dismissed. The judge did not err in finding the marriage agreement operated unfairly or in ordering reapportionment. However, the degree of reapportionment must be remitted to the trial court, as the judge erroneously considered Ms. D.’s potential inheritances, did not consider certain features of Ms. D.’s trust interests, misapprehended Ms. D.’s indirect contributions to the acquisition of property, and did not provide a clear explanation for the specific reapportionment selected. Spousal support also must be remitted because it should not be determined absent a settled view on the division of property, which now has the opportunity for a material change. Further, the judge does not appear to have considered Ms. D.’s compensatory claim to spousal support, and has not clearly explained the basis for departing from the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.
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H.Y. Louie Co. Limited v. Bowick,
2015 BCCA 256
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2015/06/05
Court of Appeal
The appellant invoiced the respondent for a quantity of goods and services. The respondent sued for breach of contract alleging that all or part of the goods and services were not provided. The appellant was examined for discovery. He consented to two judgments totalling $711,358.73. The respondent took execution proceedings on the judgments. The appellant declared bankruptcy. The respondent claimed on the judgments in the bankruptcy and sought a declaration from the court that the judgments resulted from obtaining property or services by false pretences pursuant to s. 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and would not be released on the appellant’s discharge from bankruptcy. The appellant denied dishonest conduct and asserted that he erred in keeping his records. Based on affidavit evidence and portions of the appellant’s examination for discovery, the chambers judge made the requested declaration. On appeal: appeal allowed and declaration set aside (Chiasson J.A., Frankel J.A. concurring). Relevant to characterizing the judgments is merger, cause of action estoppel and abuse of process. These concepts are not determinative in the context of this case, but they inform the analysis. Any claim that the respondent had that the appellant obtained property by false pretences was merged in the judgments. While the court could look beyond the judgments for the purposes of s. 178, characterization is based on the pleadings and proceedings in the court that made the judgments. In the present case, the appellant did not consent to judgment for obtaining property by false pretences and the judgments were not for such a claim. The respondent seeks to obtain indirectly what it could not obtain directly: judgment for obtaining property by false pretences.
Per Newbury J.A. dissenting: Res judicata and abuse of process do not bar H.Y. Louie’s application. It is not bringing a new proceeding against Defendant; nor is it seeking additional relief. It is simply attempting to enforce relief it has already been granted by way of a process specifically anticipated by BIA. In determining whether a consent judgment falls under s. 178, court may look to the pleadings to see whether the liability is properly characterized as falling under one of the circumstances listed based on the facts as alleged. The exact language included in s. 178 need not be used. Here, the pleadings disclosed that Defendant charged H.Y. Louie for goods and services that were never provided. Although fraud was not specifically pleaded as a cause of action, the magnitude of the charges was such that it could be inferred from the pleadings at least that Defendant was recklessly indifferent as to the truth of his representations. Thus the pleadings were sufficient to permit the inference to be drawn that the liability fell under s. 178(1)(e).
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Ha v. Fritzke,
1999 BCCA 667
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1999/11/18
Court of Appeal
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Habitat for Humanity Canada v. Hearts and Hands for Homes Society,
2016 BCCA 217
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2016/05/20
Court of Appeal
This appeal raises the issue of whether the trial judge correctly interpreted and enforced a clause in an affiliation agreement. HELD: Appeal dismissed.
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Habitat for Humanity v. Hearts and Hands for Homes Society,
2015 BCCA 443
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2015/10/23
Court of Appeal
Habitat’s application to hold the appeal in abeyance is dismissed. HHHS is directed to post security for the costs of the appeal in the amount of $8,000 within seven days of the release of these reasons, failing which Habitat may apply to have the appeal dismissed for want of prosecution. The appeal is stayed pending the posting of the security. Habitat is granted an extension of time to file its factum to 14 days from the date that HHHS posts security for costs.
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Hackl (Guardian of) v. Board of School Trustees School District no. 88 (Terrence),
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1990/11/30
Court of Appeal
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Hadcock v. Georgia Pacific Securities Corp.,
2006 BCCA 536
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2006/11/30
Court of Appeal
The appellants agreed to remove a trading restriction from and then to sell the respondents' shares in consideration of which the respondents agreed to pay commissions. Although no time was specified for the removal of the trading restriction, the respondents were anxious to sell their shares. The appellants were obliged to effect the removal within a reasonable time. The appellants delayed taking steps to remove the trading restriction and the respondents retrieved their shares from the appellants and gave them to another broker. At the time they took the shares back, the reasonable time for removing the trading restriction had not expired. The case was pleaded, presented, argued and decided on the basis of a simple breach of contract and negligence, although in the Prayer for Relief in the Statement of Claim reference was made to agency and fiduciary duty. Neither these concepts nor the material facts required to support them were pleaded in the Statement of Claim. The trial judge held the appellants liable in contract and tort and awarded damages. It was not alleged that the appellants had committed a fundamental breach of contract or had repudiated the contract. The respondents specifically stated that these were not the causes of action advanced by them. Having taken back their shares, the respondents ended their legal relationship with the appellants. Effectively, they repudiated the contract and their repudiation was accepted by the appellants. The rights and obligations of the parties ended, subject only to any causes of action which had crystallized before the respondents retrieved their shares. The time for performance by the appellants not having arrived, the respondents did not have a matured cause of action in contract or tort. The appeal is allowed and the action is dismissed.
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Hadcock v. Georgia Pacific Securities Corp.,
2007 BCCA 127
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2007/02/27
Court of Appeal
Supplementary reasons refusing application to re-open the appeal. See 2006 BCCA 536.
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Haddad Estate v. Hill,
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1994/11/22
Court of Appeal
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Hadikin v. Boon,
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1996/02/23
Court of Appeal
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Hadley Estate (Re),
2017 BCCA 311
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2017/09/05
Court of Appeal
The appellants challenge the judge’s order that a will executed in 2008 governs the estate of the deceased. The order was made based on her finding that a handwritten will in a journal did not represent a deliberate and final expression of the deceased’s testamentary intentions, such that it could not be declared fully effective pursuant to s. 58 of the WESA. The appellants say that the judge reached this conclusion based on irrelevant extrinsic evidence. Held: appeal dismissed. The judge’s determination that the document did not represent the deceased’s testamentary intentions is entitled to deference, and the extrinsic evidence she considered was relevant to this issue. The finding that the document did not represent the deceased’s testamentary intentions and, accordingly, could not be cured under s. 58 is without error.
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Hagen v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia,
2011 BCCA 124
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2011/03/16
Court of Appeal
ICBC appeals from an order finding the plaintiff entitled to Part 7 benefits. The Motor Vehicle Act Regulations require a person learning to drive a motorcycle to hold a learner’s permit and be under the direct supervision of a person holding a full licence. The plaintiff, a learner, arranged for his wife, who holds a full licence, to follow his motorcycle in his car. Along the agreed route the plaintiff’s wife momentarily lost sight of the plaintiff and reasoned he had turned at an intersection. Accordingly she turned off the agreed route. The plaintiff, however, was proceeding as agreed. Almost immediately after the wife turned the plaintiff was hit by a u-turning truck. Held: appeal dismissed. The regulation in issue is directed to the behaviour of the learner, and must be read focusing upon behaviour for which he can be responsible. It requires the learner to take all reasonable steps to ensure compliance. It was open to the judge, on the evidence, to conclude the plaintiff fulfilled his obligation.
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Hagen v. Thompson Valley Insurance Agency Ltd.,
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1993/10/22
Court of Appeal
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Haghdust v. British Columbia Lottery Corporation,
2012 BCCA 120
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2012/03/13
Court of Appeal
Leave to appeal a refusal of summary judgment dismissed. The decision was discretionary and founded on principles of judicial economy and the interests of justice. No chance of success.
The questions of law were mixed up in the facts. The judge found he could not justly decide the legal questions without a full record.
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Hague v. Hague,
2022 BCCA 325
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2022/09/26
Court of Appeal
The appellant and respondent were together for 35 years. In 2011, they entered a consent order that divided their family property equally and required the respondent to pay spousal support to the appellant. The respondent turned 65 in 2020 and retired in 2021. The chambers judge found the respondent’s decision to retire to be reasonable and a material change in circumstances. He terminated the spousal support order. The appellant submits that the judge: (1) gave insufficient reasons; (2) erred by failing to consider her compensatory claim for spousal support; and (3) erred by terminating spousal support before she had been adequately compensated for the disadvantages she suffered as a result of the parties’ marriage and its breakdown. Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge could have clearly stated the framework for varying spousal support and more fully explained his reasons for terminating spousal support. Further, the judge made some minor errors in his determination of the parties’ incomes. Nevertheless, the judge applied the appropriate framework, considered Ms. Hague’s compensatory claim for ongoing spousal support, reached a conclusion that was open to him on the record and adequately explained why he reached that conclusion.
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Hagwilneghl v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd.,
2011 BCCA 478
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2011/11/25
Court of Appeal
A Supreme Court Chambers Judge refused to grant an interlocutory injunction to Canadian Forest Products, Ltd.(Canfor) against First nation members who blockaded a roadway to the area of Canfor’s licensed cutting permit (CP-324), and granted an interlocutory injunction against it to one of the two respondents. Canfor applied for leave to appeal both orders. Canfor contended that:
a) that the Chambers Judge erred by failing to conclude that the injunctive relief sought by the respondents was an impermissible collateral attack on the cutting permit in an attempt to circumvent the procedures required by the decision in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511;
b) that the Chambers Judge erred in finding that the applicant had failed to establish that it would suffer irreparable harm if it were not permitted to continue to harvest under CP-324; and
c) that the Chambers Judge erred in identifying the area in issue, resulting in an erroneous finding that the balance of convenience favoured the Kelah respondents.
and that the Chambers Judge did not to have address whether the injunction sought and obtained constituted a de facto or a de jure stay or injunction against the Crown, contrary to the Crown Proceeding Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 89, s. 11.
Held: leave to appeal the orders of the Chambers Judge granted, limited to the issue of whether by granting and refusing to grant the injunctions that she did, the Chambers Judge erred in law by permitting an impermissible collateral attack on CP-324, and allowing the Kelah respondents to circumvent the procedure for consultation and if necessary, accommodation of the First Nation interests as mandated by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Haida Nation.
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Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Attorney General),
2018 BCCA 462
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2018/12/04
Court of Appeal
The Haida Nation sought and obtained a severance order in an Aboriginal rights and title case. The severance order divided the issues to be addressed in the two phases differently than had been proposed by the Haida Nation. The Haida Nation appeals the part of the order that specifies which issues are to be resolved in each phase. Held: appeal dismissed. A high degree of deference is owed to a case management judge in determining how a trial should proceed. No error of principle was identified that warrants interference by this Court.
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Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests),
2002 BCCA 223
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2002/04/05
Court of Appeal
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Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests),
2002 BCCA 147
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2002/02/27
Court of Appeal
The Haida Nation brought this petition for remedies arising from a claim to aboriginal title and aboriginal rights over Haida Gwaii. They said that when Tree Farm Licence 39 was renewed in 2000 the Crown and Weyerhaeuser knew of their claims and had sufficient information to assess the strength of their claims but had refused to consult the Haida Nation or to seek any accommodation. The Supreme Court judge in chambers dismissed the petition. On appeal to this Court the appeal was allowed. In the circumstances, there was an enforceable legal and equitable duty to consult and to seek accommodation. The Court followed the previous decision of the Court in the Taku River Tlingit case. A declaratory order was made, with an order for liberty to apply if any further remedy proved necessary.
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Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests),
2002 BCCA 462
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2002/08/19
Court of Appeal
On a re-hearing of the appeal in which the court pronounced judgment on 27 February 2002, a majority of the court modified the earlier declaration to say: The Crown provincial had in 2000, and the Crown and Weyerhaeuser have now, legally enforceable duties to the Haida people to consult with them in good faith and to endeavour to seek workable accommodations between the aboriginal interests of the Haida people, on the one hand, and the short term and long term objectives of the Crown and Weyerhaeuser to manage TFL 39 and Block 6 in accordance with the public interest, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal, on the other hand. Low J.A. dissenting would have confined the court's order to a declaration against the Crown alone.
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Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests),
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1997/11/07
Court of Appeal
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Haigh v. Haigh,
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1997/06/20
Court of Appeal
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Haigh v. Haigh,
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1991/06/14
Court of Appeal
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Haigh v. Kent,
2013 BCCA 380
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2013/08/29
Court of Appeal
The trial judge awarded Mr. Haigh a 25% constructive trust interest in property on which a resort business had been conducted. The business was described as an informal, undocumented family business. Mr. Haigh contributed for more than 20 years to the business in ways that enhanced the business and improved the land. In the early 2000s he ceased to be involved in the business, but continued to live on the property. The judge concluded that Mr. Haigh had unjustly enriched the Kents and that a constructive trust rather than a monetary award was appropriate.
Appeal Dismissed. Harris J.A. (Newbury J.A. concurring). It was open on the evidence for the judge to find unjust enrichment and to reject the Kents’ argument that there was a juristic reason for the enrichment, namely, Mr. Haigh’s participation in a partnership which would entitle him to only to a share of the value of the business when the partnership ended. Further, it was open to the judge to conclude that the land and business were intertwined and that Mr. Haigh had substantially and directly contributed to the property through his contributions to the business. The judge appreciated that Mr. Haigh did not contribute to the business in order to earn an interest in the property, but it was open to the judge to award a constructive trust in the property given the nature and extent of Mr. Haigh’s contribution to it. The judge did not err in awarding a constructive trust rather than limiting the remedy to a monetary award.
Chiasson J.A. (dissenting) would substitute a monetary award for a constructive trust. Constructive trust is available as a remedy for unjust enrichment only if a monetary award would be inadequate. The trial judge concluded that a monetary award based on value received was not appropriate, but he did not address an award based on value survived as he was required to do. There is no finding and no reason why such an award would be inadequate. The judge’s finding that the business and land were intertwined was not supported by the evidence and was contrary to the testimony of the claimant and his former wife.
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Haight-Smith v. Betton,
2003 BCCA 454
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2003/06/12
Court of Appeal
Time was extended for serving notice of appeal. In arrears costs were refunded to the respondent.
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Haight-Smith v. Neden,
2002 BCCA 329
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2002/05/07
Court of Appeal
In an application by the respondents for extension of time to file their factum, the chambers judge ordered that the appellant recover her costs. A dispute arose as to whether the chambers judge ordered recovery of fees plus disbursement costs or disbursements only. It is clear from the transcribed reasons that the judge meant the former. The transcript should govern, not the clerk's notes.
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Haight-Smith v. Neden,
2002 BCCA 132
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2002/02/27
Court of Appeal
2002 BCCA 132 Haight-Smith v. NedenAppeal by a retired teacher from dismissal of actions for defamation against employees of the School Board after a summary trial under Rule 18A of the Supreme Court Rules. The trial judge held that the court did not have jurisdiction to deal with the appellant's claims as they arose out of the collective agreement. Respondents who were not covered by the collective agreement were protected by qualified privilege. Held: appeal dismissed. The trial judge did not err in finding, after a summary trial, that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the complaints and that respondents not covered by the collective agreement were protected by qualified privilege.
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Haile v. Johns, Plasman and I.C.B.C.,
2005 BCCA 517
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2005/10/25
Court of Appeal
The trial judge did not compensate the plaintiff for the possibility that he might, at some future date, return to his trade as a glazier. Even though no more than a possibility, such an award was required by Steenblok v. Funk.
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Haje v. College of Teachers,
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1997/09/02
Court of Appeal
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Haje v. College of Teachers,
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1996/09/09
Court of Appeal
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Halagan v. British Columbia (Securities Commission),
2002 BCCA 288
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2002/05/03
Court of Appeal
Reasons to follow where application to extend time for filing Appeal Record, Appeal Book, Factum and Certificate of Readiness was granted.The new Court of Appeal Rules (effective March 1, 2002), governing the preparation and filing of an Appeal Record, Appeal Book, Transcript, and Certificate of Readiness, which are all procedural in nature, are presumed to take effect immediately.
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Halagan v. Reifel,
2001 BCCA 434
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2001/06/26
Court of Appeal
Appeal of order declaring respondent to be the beneficial owner of certain escrow shares in a publicly traded company dismissed. Trial judge did not err in determining that a presumption of a resulting trust had been rebutted.
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