Written Reasons by:
The Honourable Madam Justice Prowse

Concurred in by:
The Honourable Mr. Justice Hall
The Honourable Madam Justice Levine

[1] This is an application by Ms. Morrow, acting in person, for a review of the order of Mr. Justice Hollinrake, made August 21, 2001. Mr. Justice Hollinrake dismissed Ms. Morrow's application for leave to appeal and her application for an extension of time to file her notice of appeal and appeal books, with respect to her proposed appeal from the decision of Mr. Justice Cullen, made July 10, 2001.

[2] In his decision, Mr. Justice Cullen dismissed Ms. Morrow's application for various relief, including an order that the Special Compensation Fund pay Ms. Morrow over $20 million which she claimed remained owing to her as a result of unfortunate dealings she had with a former member of the Law Society of British Columbia, Mr. Albert Constantini.

[3] Mr. Justice Hollinrake dismissed Ms. Morrow's applications on the basis that her proposed appeal from the decision of Mr. Justice Cullen was entirely without merit, to the extent that it was vexatious.

[4] I do not propose to go into the extremely lengthy history underlying these applications since, as Mr. Justice Hollinrake noted, this history is well known to Ms. Morrow and to these courts. It is necessary to refer to a segment of that history, however, to place Mr. Justice Hollinrake's decision in context.

[5] I begin by noting that Ms. Morrow required leave to appeal from Mr. Justice Cullen's order as a result of an order made by Mr. Justice Wallace in Chambers on March 3, 1988, pursuant to then s. 29.1 of the Court of Appeal Act, providing that Ms. Morrow could not bring further proceedings in this Court without leave of a justice. In making that order, which was upheld on appeal by a panel of this Court (March 29, 1988, Vancouver CA006504 and CA008105), Mr. Justice Wallace stated (at p. 7):

[6] A similar order was made by Madam Justice Rowles pursuant to then s. 67 of the Supreme Court Act on June 29, 1988.

[7] On June 19, 2001, Ms. Morrow obtained an ex parte order from Chief Justice Brenner permitting her to bring an application in Supreme Court Chambers on June 22, 2001. That is the application which was heard by Mr. Justice Cullen.

[8] Mr. Justice Cullen noted that the application before him purported to be pursuant to a petition filed by Ms. Morrow on November 8, 1993, pursuant to the Judicial Review Procedure Act. In that petition, Ms. Morrow challenged the decision of the Special Compensation Fund Committee made July 30, 1992 restricting her compensation from the fund arising from her dealings with Mr. Constantini to $1,500 plus interest. After numerous further proceedings, Ms. Morrow succeeded in increasing the award of compensation due to her from the Special Compensation Fund to $129,846.18, inclusive of interest.

[9] As noted by Mr. Justice Cullen in his decision, Ms. Morrow signed an instrument dated March 19, 1996, releasing the Law Society of British Columbia and the Special Compensation Fund, from "all claims, demands, actions, proceedings and accounts whatsoever arising out of or in any way connected with monies owing to myself from Albert Gene Constantini . . . ." Mr. Justice Cullen relied on that release, in part, in dismissing Ms. Morrow's applications. At para. 11 of his decision, he stated:

[10] On August 14, 2001, Ms. Morrow filed a Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal from the order of Mr. Justice Cullen, as required by the order of Mr. Justice Wallace. In her Notice, Ms. Morrow stated her grounds of appeal, as follows:

[11] As noted by counsel for the respondent, it is unclear what Ms. Morrow meant in stating that her claim should have gone before a panel for final adjudication. It may be that her point was that her appeal should be heard by a full panel of this Court on the merits, rather than being screened by a justice pursuant to Mr. Justice Wallace's 1988 order. I was simply unable to discover anything in the materials before the Court which would explain or substantiate this proposed ground of appeal in any way.

[12] With respect to the ground of appeal relating to the release, counsel for the respondent said that it was Ms. Morrow who raised the subject of the release at the hearing before Mr. Justice Cullen, if only to argue that it should not be binding on her. In those circumstances, she can hardly complain that the document was presented to the judge for his consideration. There is no merit in this ground of appeal. Further, the question of the constitutionality of s. 52 of the Legal Profession Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 255, was not before Mr. Justice Cullen and no notices were given pursuant to the Constitutional Question Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 68. It is apparent that this ground of appeal was not properly raised and had no prospect of succeeding in the circumstances.

[13] In both her written and her oral submissions, Ms. Morrow referred to several other arguments to support her view that her appeal is meritorious and should be permitted to proceed. Little purpose would be served by detailing those arguments here. Suffice it to say that, although it is apparent that Ms. Morrow continues to feel genuinely aggrieved by her treatment at the hands of lawyers, the Law Society and the courts, I am unable to find any basis for concluding that Mr. Justice Hollinrake erred in finding that her proposed appeal is entirely without merit. That being the case, there is no basis for interfering with Mr. Justice Hollinrake's order dismissing her application for leave to appeal and her applications for extensions of time.

[14] In the result, I would dismiss the application for review.

"The Honourable Madam Justice Prowse"

I AGREE:

"The Honourable Mr. Justice Hall"

I AGREE:

"The Honourable Madam Justice Levine"