Date: 19990601 Docket: 96634-D Registry: Victoria IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN AGAINST PATRICK DAVID LEES REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE QUIJANO Counsel for the Accused: J. Green/B. Curry Counsel for the Crown: S. Van Alstine/J. Power Place and Dates of Hearing: Victoria, B.C. April 12 - 16, 1999; April 19 - 21, 1999; April 26 - 28, 1999; May 3 - 5, 1999; May 7, 1999; May 10 - 12, 1999; May 28, 1999. INTRODUCTION [1] Patrick Lees is charged with second degree murder in the death of his wife, Laurie Lees, which occurred on January 21, 1998 at their home in Saanich, British Columbia. [2] There is no doubt that the accused, Patrick Lees, caused the death of Laurie Lees by strangling her with a belt in the early morning hours of January 21, 1998. [3] The Crown must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, only that: 1. Mr. Lees intended to kill or intended to cause his wife bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause her death, and was reckless whether death ensued or not. 2. He did so voluntarily. [4] Mr. Lees raises the following defenses: 1. Mental disorder automatism; or alternatively, 2. Provocation. REVIEW OF THE FACTS [5] The parties were married in 1988. From Mr. Lees' perspective his wife was dominant in the relationship. Mr. Lees avoided conflict in the relationship by withdrawing or acquiescing. They did, however, have ongoing tension in relation to Mr. Lees' complaints about Laurie Lees' spending habits and in relation to Laurie Lees' complaint that Mr. Lees was rarely home with the family. [6] In February 1997, Mr. Lees was diagnosed as clinically depressed. His psychiatrist, Dr. Stovel, treated the depression with Prozac. [7] By October 1997, Dr. Stovel found Mr. Lees' depression to be well managed by the Prozac. He felt Mr. Lees' depression was in remission. [8] In December 1997, Mr. Lees met with his financial planner and told her he wanted all of his money "out of the market". He believed that the world economy was about to collapse. He was described by his financial planner as acting weird and out of character. At the same time he told his financial planner that he was going to separate from his wife and he changed the beneficiaries of his RRSP's and life insurance policies from his wife to his children. [9] On January 15, 1998, Mr. Lees attended an appointment with Dr. Stovel. Laurie Lees was also in attendance, as she had been at many of the appointments with Dr. Stovel. That appointment was a follow-up which had been arranged at the time of the October appointment. At that appointment Mr. Lees told Dr. Stovel that he and his wife were going to separate. Dr. Stovel referred the couple to Dr. Lustig, a psychologist, for separation counseling. Dr. Stovel assessed Mr. Lees at that time as mentally well, not hypomanic: "He wasn't depressed at all." [10] Patrick Lees and Laurie Lees saw Dr. Lustig on January 19, 1998. During that meeting Laurie Lees told Mr. Lees that she had been to see a lawyer about their separation. Dr. Lustig noted that Mr. Lees posture and body language disclosed that he was angered by this information, particularly when he learned that the lawyer was someone he knew. According to Dr. Lustig, Mr. Lees responded by saying to his wife, "I've underestimated you." to which Laurie Lees responded, "Boy are you going to be upset when you see what he's got planned." Patrick Lees then left, saying that the meeting had been "most helpful". [11] Dr. Lustig said Mr. Lees became very angry during this exchange but he worked hard to control himself. [12] Laurie Lees stayed on with Dr. Lustig, and at the end of the meeting Dr. Lustig advised her not to discuss money matters with Mr. Lees that evening. [13] On January 19, 1998, Mr. Lees went to his bank and ordered $200,000 in $100 bills. On January 20, he attempted to cancel the order. He said that he wanted the cash to use in relation to the purchase of a duplex he was interested in. [14] On January 20, Laurie Lees met with her lawyer to finalize her Divorce Petition. In the draft petition the date of separation was to be January 21, 1998. Laurie Lees was advised by her lawyer to move out of the matrimonial bedroom that night. [15] On January 20, Mr. Lees was at work for the entire day. He was described by his colleagues as normal, not unusual. He gave instructions to his assistant to prepare documents relating to the purchase of the duplex he was interested in. [16] On January 20, Laurie Lees spent time with two of her friends, individually. They described her as in good spirits, accepting of the fact that her marriage was over and looking forward to getting on with her life. [17] The evening of January 20, 1998 was described by Mr. Lees. He had a very detailed recollection of the first part of the evening. He denied any discussion of separation or money issues. He said that an incident occurred in their bedroom at 9:30 p.m. when Laurie Lees removed two objects of sentimental significance from her dresser and threw them on the bed while making disparaging comments. He says that upset him, that he was hurt, sad and angry. He said he responded by going downstairs where he sat alone and had two gin and tonics. [18] At about 10:30 p.m., Mr. Lees went back upstairs to bed. His wife was already in bed and asleep. He says that around midnight he was awakened by his wife punching or kicking him in the arm because he was snoring. He hit her with a pillow and she got up and began yelling at him to get out of the house. [19] He says that he got up and went to closet to get dressed and leave. He says that as he reached the closet entrance his wife was standing by the foot of the bed, about ten feet away from him. She said "If you don't give me everything I want I will ruin you. I will tell them you sexually molested "K"." [20] He says that is the last thing he remembers until he found himself kneeling over her body on the bed with a belt around her neck. The belt had been draped over the top of his belt rack located inside the walk-in closet. [21] After finding himself kneeling on the bed he then called his brother Kevin and asked him to come to his house but not before 6:00 a.m. His brother asked him a number of questions, to all of which Mr. Lees was responsive. He said he had killed his wife, he had strangled her because she had threatened to accuse him of molesting their daughter. His tone of voice was described by his brother as being "upset, distraught, fearful, disconnected, unnatural". [22] Kevin Lees asked him how long it had been since he had strangled his wife and Mr. Lees said three minutes. Kevin Lees told him to start CPR. From the sounds heard by Kevin Lees, Patrick Lees tried a few breaths and then returned to the phone to say it was not working. Kevin Lees told him to keep trying. [23] Patrick Lees' brother Sean then phoned to tell him that the police and an ambulance were on the way and that he, Sean, was coming over. Patrick Lees then left off the CPR, and went downstairs to open the front door, turn on the lights and disable the home alarm system. [24] When the police arrived they found Mr. Lees in the upstairs bedroom kneeling over his wife's body. He was heard to say, before the police entered the bedroom, "Don't do this to me, Laurie. Don't die on me." [25] After the police arrived it was quickly decided that Mr. Lees had to be removed from the scene. He was taken downstairs and invited to sit down on a couch in the living room area. He was compliant. Subsequently, while still at the home, he was responsive when asked his name, he was responsive when asked if he was suffering from a heart condition and he was responsive when asked where the police could find some clothing for him to wear. ANALYSIS DEFENCE OF AUTOMATISM [26] In R. v. Stone, [1999] S.C.J. No. 27 (Q.L.), the Supreme Court of Canada clarified what is required to establish the defence of automatism, whether mental disorder or non-mental disorder automatism. In R. v. Stone, the court articulated the general test and the burden of proof to be applied to all cases involving claims of automatism. [27] What is clear from Stone is that, whereas previously in order for the defence to be put to the jury the accused needed only to satisfy the trial judge that there was some evidence upon which the jury could find that the accused was in an automatistic state at the time, now the threshold is higher. A trial judge sitting with a jury is not to put the defence to the jury unless he or she is satisfied that a proper foundation has been established. That is, that there is evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could find that the accused was, on a balance of probabilities, in an automatistic state. This requires the trial judge to weigh the evidence before deciding whether to put the defence to the jury. [28] Prior to Stone, a finding of some evidence had the effect of shifting the burden to the Crown to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. Now, if the trial judge puts the defence to the jury, the accused must establish on a balance of probabilities that he or she was in an automatistic state at the time of the events giving rise to the charge. [29] If the defence is not established on a balance of probabilities then it is not available. The Crown need not prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt because voluntariness is presumed and the defence has failed to rebut that presumption. If the defence is established on a balance of probabilities then it remains to be determined whether it is mental disorder or non-mental disorder automatism. [30] Where the trial judge is sitting without a jury there would not seem to be any reason for the trial judge to embark on the initial test. Rather the trial judge, as the trier of fact, should proceed to consider whether the defence has been established on a balance of probabilities without being concerned to determine whether there is some evidence upon which the properly instructed trier of fact could find the defence to have been established. [31] In R. v. Stone, the Supreme Court of Canada said the following: "The law presumes that people act voluntarily. Accordingly, since a defence of automatism amounts to a claim that one's actions were not voluntary, the accused must rebut the presumption of voluntariness." (para. 171) "... the legal burden in cases involving claims of automatism must be on the defence to prove involuntariness on a balance of probabilities to the trier of fact." (para. 179) The accused must claim that he acted involuntarily at the relevant time, a mere assertion of involuntariness will not suffice. In addition to an assertion of voluntariness, the defence must present expert psychiatric evidence confirming its claim. (paras. 183-184) The weight to be given to the expert testimony must be assessed in the context of other relevant evidence: for example, a previous history of automatistic-like dissociative states, in which case the evidence might be given more weight, or whether the opinions were based solely or largely on what the accused had told him or her, in which case the evidence might be given less weight. (para. 186) "... this burden will generally require more than an assertion of involuntariness on the part of the accused accompanied by confirming expert evidence that automatism is plausible assuming the account of events given to the expert by the accused was accurate and truthful." (para. 187) Motive is a factor to be considered. "A motiveless act will generally lend plausibility to an accused's claim of involuntariness. ... the plausibility of a claim of automatism will be reduced if the accused had a motive to commit the crime in question or if the "trigger" of the alleged automatism is also the victim." (para. 191) ... "the burden will only be met where the trial judge concludes that there is evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could find that the accused acted involuntarily on a balance of probabilities." (para. 192) If the accused does not meet the burden it is not necessary to determine whether the automatism was mental or non-mental. (para. 193) [32] To maintain a defence of automatism the burden is on Mr. Lees to establish on a balance of probabilities that the threat made by his wife was so "extremely shocking" that it triggered in him a dissociative episode of such severity that he did not have control over his actions and did not have the capacity to form the intent to do what he did. Thus his actions were not voluntary. Mr. Lees said that the last thing he remembers before finding himself kneeling over his wife's body is her threat. On that basis he asserts that in the intervening period he did not have voluntary control of his actions. [33] The accused provided the court with evidence from a psychiatrist, Dr. Devlin, and a psychologist, Dr. Ley, which was intended to confirm the assertion. [34] Both Dr. Devlin and Dr. Ley were of the view that the threat by Laurie Lees to accuse her husband of molesting his daughter was, for Mr. Lees, a psychological blow capable of triggering a dissociative episode. These opinions are based on what Mr. Lees told them was the unique importance to him of his relationship with his daughter. Neither Dr. Devlin nor Dr. Ley interviewed any collateral sources to obtain independent descriptions of the nature and quality of Mr. Lees relationship with his daughter. Other than what Mr. Lees reported, there is no other evidence to support that conclusion. There is evidence to suggest the relationship was not of unique significance. For example, it is clear that Mr. Lees' lack of involvement with the family was a constant source of friction between his wife and him. As well, when Laurie Lees was in hospital about to give birth to their first child, Mr. Lees, although present, was on his cell phone negotiating the purchase of a new automobile. There is also evidence from Dr. Smith and Dr. Stovel to the effect that Mr. Lees only mentioned his children in relation to his complaints about his wife's spending habits. I therefore find the opinions of Dr. Devlin and Dr. Ley as to the importance to Mr. Lees of his relationship to his daughter to be unsupported by any evidence other than that of Mr. Lees. Therefore, I am not persuaded on a balance of probabilities that the threat was sufficient to constitute a psychological blow capable of triggering a dissociative episode. [35] It is next necessary to consider the expert evidence as to whether it is probable that the accused was in an automatistic state at the relevant time. [36] It is clear from all of the expert evidence that amnesia alone is not symptomatically sufficient to support a conclusion that an individual is in a severe dissociative state such that they do not have conscious control over their actions. Amnesia in these circumstances could equally be stress induced and not dissociative. There must also be reported symptoms consistent with de-personalization or de-realization. [37] Both Dr. Devlin and Dr. Ley were of the view that Mr. Lees' description of a sense of "rushing in" when he found himself kneeling over his wife's body and his description of a "sensation of movement" when he returned to the scene a week or so after his wife's death were consistent with de-realization. On that basis they concluded, taking that evidence along with the self-reported amnesia and the description of Mr. Lees' voice in the phone call with his brother Kevin, that Mr. Lees was likely in a dissociative state of such severity that he had no conscious awareness of what he was doing, therefore he had no conscious control over what he was doing and no conscious capacity to form the necessary intent to do what he did. [38] It was also argued, on behalf of Mr. Lees, that the evidence of the Crown's expert, Dr. O'Shaughnessy, when considered in the context of the evidence of de-realization identified by Dr. Ley and Dr. Devlin, supports a conclusion that Mr. Lees was in a severe dissociative state at the time he strangled his wife. For reasons which are set out below, I do not agree. [39] Based on all of the material he had reviewed, on his interview with Mr. Lees and on the two instances that the defence considered to be descriptions of de-realization, Dr. O'Shaughnessy was of the opinion that there was no clinically significant evidence of de-personalization or de-realization nor was the previously reported sleepwalking history significant. He concluded that the fact of the self- reported amnesia standing alone could not lead to a conclusion of dissociation of such a severity that Mr. Lees would neither have been capable of forming the necessary intent nor have been in control of his actions. [40] I found Dr. O'Shaughnessy's evidence to be coherent and persuasive. [41] Based on the whole of the expert evidence I am not satisfied that the two events described by Mr. Lees can be said to amount to more than a possible or plausible, not probable, description of de-realization. That is not sufficient to meet the burden of establishing on a balance of probabilities that at the time Mr. Lees took his wife's life, he was in a severe dissociative state and his actions were therefore not voluntary. [42] Having come to this conclusion it is not necessary to determine whether the accused suffered from a mental disorder. INTENT [43] Having determined that the accused was not in an automatistic state at the relevant time, it is now necessary to consider whether the Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Lees intended to kill his wife or cause her bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause her death, and was reckless whether death ensued or not. [44] Laurie Lees died as a result of ligature strangulation. The ligature used was a belt. The belt belonged to the accused and had been hanging draped over his belt rack in the couple's walk-in closet. Earlier in the evening the couple had had an argument, in the course of which Laurie Lees had taken a picture of Mr. Lees and a framed anniversary present off of her dresser and thrown them on the bed. This incident was very upsetting to Mr. Lees. He felt hurt and angry. He withdrew to the downstairs where he had two substantial gin and tonics and sat in his den for about an hour. He then returned to the bedroom and went to bed. Laurie Lees was already in bed and asleep. An hour and a half later, just prior to the murder, Laurie Lees threatened to accuse Mr. Lees of molesting their daughter. Although there is no evidence as to what next occurred, the next evidence we have is that Mr. Lees was kneeling over his wife's body on the bed, the belt was around her neck and she was unconscious, if not already dead. [45] Approximately three minutes later, Mr. Lees telephoned his brother. In that conversation Mr. Lees told him that he had killed his wife because she had threatened to accuse him of molesting their daughter. [46] I conclude, on the basis of all of this evidence, that Mr. Lees was enraged by the threat, grabbed the belt with the intention to do harm to Laurie Lees and then attacked her, wrapping the belt around her neck and applying enough force over a sufficient period of time to cause her death. [47] The question remains whether Mr. Lees meant to cause the death of his wife or meant to cause her bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause her death, and was reckless whether death ensued or not. [48] The evidence of the forensic pathologists confirms that with ligature strangulation there is 15 to 30 seconds before the victim is unconscious and a further 1 to 5 minutes until the victim is dead. It is also apparent from the forensic pathologists' evidence that sufficient force must be applied to the ligature continuously to the time of death. [49] It was argued that the evidence of Mr. Lees' attempts at CPR indicate that it was not his intention to cause his wife's death. I do not consider the evidence of Mr. Lees' apparent efforts at CPR to be of any significance to the question as to whether, when he strangled her with a belt, Mr. Lees intended to cause his wife bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause her death, and was reckless whether death ensued or not. At the very best, those efforts at CPR suggest that by the time Mr. Lees was attempting CPR he wanted his wife to live. I do not think the evidence goes that far. [50] Considering the whole of the evidence of Mr. Lees' actions at the home just after he realized that he had apparently killed his wife, it is clear that he did not consider CPR until after he called his brother Kevin, that thereafter he made cursory efforts at best and that he gave priority to disarming the home alarm system, turning on the lights and opening the front door. [51] Based on the whole of the evidence I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Lees intended to kill his wife or cause bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause her death, and was reckless whether death ensued or not. PROVOCATION [52] Mr. Lees says that if he was not in an automatistic state at the relevant time and if it is established that he had the requisite intent then he was provoked to the act by the threat that his wife made to accuse him of molesting their daughter. [53] The defence of provocation is set out in s. 232 of the Criminal Code. The section reads, in part: 232. (1) Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder may be reduced to manslaughter if the person who committed it did so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation. (2) A wrongful act or an insult that is of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control is provocation for the purposes of this section if the accused acted on it on the sudden and before there was time for his passion to cool. (3) For the purposes of this section, the questions (a) whether a particular wrongful act or insult amounted to provocation, and (b) whether the accused was deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation that he alleges he received, are questions of fact, but no one shall be deemed to have given provocation to another by doing anything that he had a legal right to do, or by doing anything that the accused incited him to do in order to provide the accused with an excuse for causing death or bodily harm to any human being. [54] Before I, as the trier of fact, can consider the defence of provocation there is a threshold test that must be met by the defence. Cory J. in R. v. Thibert (1996), 104 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) articulated that test at page 6 where he said: ... (a) that there is some evidence to suggest that the particular wrongful act or insult alleged by the accused would have caused an ordinary person to be deprived of self-control, and (b) that there is some evidence showing that the accused was actually deprived of his or her self- control by that act or insult. [my emphasis in bold type] [55] In order to determine if there is an air of reality to the defence of provocation in this case there must be some evidence of the following: 1. A sudden wrongful act or insult; 2. The wrongful act or insult was of such a nature that an ordinary person would (not could) be deprived of self-control; 3. The accused was actually provoked by the wrongful act or insult to retaliate "on the sudden". [56] If the test is met the burden shifts to the Crown to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not provoked. [57] In considering this defence it is instructive to have regard to what was said Cory J. in Thibert, supra, at page 6: ...I think the objective element should be taken as an attempt to weigh in the balance those very human frailties which sometimes lead people to act irrationally and impulsively against the need to protect society by discouraging acts of homicidal violence. And at page 8: ... It has been properly recognized that the objective element of the test exists to ensure that the criminal law encourages reasonable and responsible behaviour. A consideration of the defence of provocation must always bear this principle in mind. On the other hand, if the test is to be applied sensibly and with sensitivity, then the ordinary person must be taken to be of the same age, and sex, and must share with the accused such other factors as would give the act or insult in question a special significance. [58] Although the evidence is not to be weighed until the latter stage, Cory J. noted at page 7 of Thibert, supra, that the trial judge must "take into account the nature of the wrongful act or insult and how that act or insult should be viewed in the context of the case." [59] Thus the threshold test requires an analysis of the "ordinary person". Who is the "ordinary person"? Cory J. dealt with this question in Thibert, supra, at pages 8-9 as follows: ... the ordinary person must be taken to be of the same age, and sex, and must share with the accused such other factors as would give the act or insult in question a special significance. In other words, all the relevant background circumstances should be considered. In the context of other cases, it may properly be found that other factors should be considered. It is how such an "ordinary" person with those characteristics would react to the situation which confronted the accused that should be used as the basis for considering the objective element. ... ... Thus, although characteristics such as a propensity to drunken rages or short-tempered violence cannot be taken into account, other characteristics may properly be considered without in any way demeaning or subverting the aim of the objective test to encourage responsible behaviour. So too, it is proper for the [trier of fact] to consider the background of the relationship between the deceased and the accused, including earlier insults which culminated in the final provocative actions or words. [60] Is there some evidence to show that an ordinary person of Mr. Lees' age, sex, and racial origin, having a similar marital history and psychological make-up, and being in the midst of a marital breakdown, would be deprived of his self-control if threatened with an accusation that he had molested his daughter, to whom he was particularly close? [61] The defence of provocation is an attempt to recognize human frailty. The threshold test is intended to be used to identify those particular cases where all of the elements are present and it is only to be considered where the threshold test has been completely satisfied. This defence is not tantamount to the defence of self-defence as considered in the "battered wife syndrome" cases. [62] Bearing in mind that the goal of the Criminal Law is to encourage reasonable and responsible behaviour and to discourage homicidal acts, it is apparent that the usual circumstances of the breakdown of a marriage, or its equivalent, standing alone would not satisfy the threshold test. The emotional trauma and associated psychological stresses of the loss of a relationship that have incited homicidal acts in other cases have not been found to be significant in this regard. There must be something more. [63] I have considered this question on the basis that the accused's evidence has not been weighed or otherwise assessed but stands as though proven and accepted as fact. I have particularly considered the evidence of the importance to Mr. Lees of his relationship with his daughter, the evidence that he was being treated for clinical depression, the evidence of Mr. Lees' behaviour in the six weeks preceding the evening of January 20, 1998, and the evidence of what took place that evening. I have concluded that there is not evidence that an "ordinary person" of the same age, sex and racial origin, and sharing these relevant factors with the accused, would have been deprived of his self-control by the threat that the victim was going to accuse him of sexually molesting his daughter. [64] The threshold test has not been satisfied. The defence of provocation is not available to Mr. Lees. [65] Should this conclusion be found to have been wrong, I will now determine whether, after weighing and assessing all of the evidence, the Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defence of provocation has not been made out. [66] The alleged act of provocation was the threat. The only evidence as to what led up to the threat is that of the accused. He said that after repeatedly screaming at him to get out of the house his wife then threatened to accuse him of molesting their daughter if she did not get everything she wanted. There was no context for the threat, since the accused denied that there had been any discussion that evening of the separation agreement or money. I do not believe the accused's evidence as to the circumstances. [67] There is no history of previous threats having been made by the deceased against the accused, whether relating to sexual abuse or at all. Therefore, to that extent the threat or insult, if it was made, can be seen to have been "sudden". [68] The next question is, would the threat have been sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of self control? In considering this question I have taken into account all of the evidence of the relationship between the parties and the personal circumstances of Mr. Lees. Some of the evidence bears comment. [69] Much was made of Mr. Lees' apparently irrational behaviour and lack of judgment in the six weeks preceding the death of his wife, all of that behaviour related to money: the Akenclose incident, the bank incident and the efforts to purchase a duplex. As to the Akenclose incident, the evidence is that Mr. Lees decided to take all of his investments out of the market after discussions with his mother and after having viewed a video and concluding that the world economy was about to collapse. His effort to take $200,000 in cash from the bank may very well have been done in an attempt to hide it from his wife. I do not believe it was, as he said, to be used to purchase the duplex. I do not find this to be irrational behaviour. Money was very important to Mr. Lees. [70] There is also the evidence of Dr. Stovel and Dr. Lustig. Dr. Stovel identified Mr. Lees as being mentally and emotionally stable on January 15, 1998. Dr. Lustig observed Mr. Lees to be mentally and emotionally stable during the meeting on January 19, 1998. Dr. Stovel also reported that Laurie Lees had told him she was concerned that her husband would hide assets from her. There was evidence from Mr. Lees' colleagues that on the 20th of January he appeared normal, rational, carrying on as he usually did, not apparently depressed or anxious or otherwise disturbed. As to the significance of clinical depression, I am persuaded that from October 1997 Mr. Lees' depression was being well-controlled by Prozac and that his depression was in remission. [71] As to the past history of the accused and the deceased, it is apparent that theirs was a dysfunctional relationship. They had not been intimate for a considerable period of time. They had a significant communication problem: Laurie Lees wanted to talk about their problems to try to resolve them while Mr. Lees coped with problems by withdrawing. Mr. Lees worked long hours, which kept him away from home. Laurie Lees' primary complaint about Mr. Lees was that he was not home enough and did not take enough responsibility for looking after the children. Laurie Lees is thought to have compensated for her unhappiness in the relationship by spending relatively substantial sums of money purchasing things that the family did not really need, mostly for the children. This was a source of great aggravation to Mr. Lees. [72] Mr. Lees had decided as early as February 1997 that the relationship would have to end. It is unclear when he first told Laurie Lees that he wanted to separate, but by December 1997 he had done so. He was described as relieved to have made the decision and as looking forward to separating and getting on with his life. He was not distressed by the fact that the relationship was at an end. [73] Laurie Lees did not want the relationship to end. She wanted to try to work things out. It is not clear what motivated her to want to save the marriage. [74] Although the evidence called by Mr. Lees suggested that in the marriage he was submissive and his wife was dominant, it is apparent that he was able to assert himself appropriately when sufficiently motivated. There is the evidence, from Mr. Lees, that Laurie Lees had to sign a marriage agreement before he would marry her. There is the evidence that on two occasions Mr. Lees took credit cards away from his wife because he felt she was spending too much. There is also the evidence of Dr. Lustig that Mr. Lees became angry when he learned that his wife had been to a lawyer and that he was able to express his feelings to his wife as he left the meeting. As well, Mr. Lees' evidence was that the only things that Laurie Lees complained about during their marriage was the fact that he was not home enough. There is no evidence that she had previously insulted or threatened him. [75] As to the significance to Mr. Lees of his relationship with his daughter, the only evidence of a special relationship was that of Mr. Lees. On that evidence alone I would conclude that Mr. Lees' relationship with his daughter was not significantly different from the relationship between any loving father and his child. In fact the evidence from independent witnesses suggests that Mr. Lees did not have an unusually close relationship with either of his children. [76] In summary, taking into account Mr. Lees' age, sex, the history of the relationship between the parties and Mr. Lees' emotional or psychological state on the day in question, I conclude that an ordinary person in similar circumstances to those which obtained the evening of January 20, 1998, would not have been provoked to lose their self-control by the threat made by Laurie Lees. [77] I find Patrick Lees guilty of second degree murder in the death of his wife, Laurie Lees. "G. M. Quijano, J." The Honourable Madam Justice Quijano