Date: 19981113 Docket: C971426 Registry: Vancouver IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA BETWEEN: DONALD ROBERT SUFFERN PLAINTIFF AND: KAREN M. BYSTROWSKI DEFENDANT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE COLLVER Counsel for the Plaintiff: Katherine E. Ducey Counsel for the Defendant: A.C. McQuarrie Place and Date of Trial: Vancouver, B.C. October 21 to 23, 1998 [1] A trailer park in the Kootenays was one of three properties which Donald Suffern and Karen Bystrowski bought while they lived together from June, 1992 to October, 1995. Mr. Suffern now claims that Ms. Bystrowski should share responsibility for repaying $45,000 borrowed to finance the trailer park purchase, contending that Ms. Bystrowski will otherwise be unjustly enriched if she retains one half of what was realized from the sale of the trailer park and their other two properties, a hobby farm and a condominium. [2] The parties' brief alliance began in the spring of 1992, when Ms. Bystrowski left an earlier relationship and with her sons, aged twelve and eleven years, moved in with Mr. Suffern. In August of 1992, Mr. Suffern and Ms. Bystrowski purchased a townhouse in Pitt Meadows. The following February they bought a small trailer park at Kimberley, and that summer acquired a nearby "hobby farm" of five acres. All three properties were registered in their joint names. [3] While the trailer park purchase was Mr. Suffern's idea, Ms. Bystrowski did not oppose the move to the Kootenays, since she had child safety concerns about Pitt Meadows. Again, when Mr. Suffern's work as a heavy duty mechanic took him to the Queen Charlotte Islands in the summer of 1993, the couple perceived an opportunity to start a business there and Mrs. Bystrowski moved without objection in September, 1994. [4] The Queen Charlottes move did not, however, work out. Ms. Bystrowski was unhappy and returned to the Kootenays the next spring. She and Mr. Suffern separated in October of 1995. [5] To their credit, during their trial testimony neither party blamed the other for the failure of their relationship. As mentioned, the issue to be decided concerns the financing of the trailer park purchase. [6] Before I turn to the case law I wish to make some observations about how Mr. Suffern and Ms. Bystrowski acquired their assets. Ms. Bystrowski contends that, because Mr. Suffern signed the promissory note evidencing the loan of $45,000 from his brother-in-law, Stan Carter, Mr. Suffern had intended to keep that obligation separate from other debts even though the trailer park was purchased in the couple's joint names. I find that to be an unreasonable interpretation of what the parties intended when they bought the trailer park. [7] When Mr. Suffern and Ms. Bystrowski acquired the townhouse, the trailer park, and the farm, they regarded their relationship as a long-term one and treated the properties as their joint estate. Mr. Suffern chose to keep financing arrangements to himself, but Ms. Bystrowski did not object. That simply reflects Mr. Suffern's preference to continue his long-term dealings with his credit union, an observation also applicable to how he dealt with Stan Carter. [8] The question then, is whether Ms. Bystrowski will be unjustly enriched if, when the monies realized from the sale of their assets are divided, she is excused from responsibility for the Carter loan. [9] Counsel for Mr. Suffern relied upon Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, and Peter v. Beblow, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980. There, unjust enrichment was discussed in the context of unmarried partners seeking constructive trust remedies reflecting expectations as to their contributions to and their interests in assets acquired during their relationship. [10] In Pettkus it was held that the requirements to establish unjust enrichment, lying at the heart of a constructive trust, are an enrichment, a corresponding deprivation, and an absence of any juristic reason for the enrichment. With respect to the third factor, Mr. Justice Dickson stated at p.849: ... I hold that where one person in a relationship tantamount to spousal prejudices herself in the reasonable expectation of receiving an interest in property and the other person in the relationship freely accepts benefits conferred by the first person in circumstances where he knows or ought to have known of that reasonable expectation, it would be unjust to allow the recipient of the benefit to retain it. [11] The court in Pettkus was speaking of one party's contribution to the relationship and the consequent need to ensure that she shared in the results of both parties' labours. [12] In approaching the more unusual problem of determining responsibility for debts existing at the end of a relationship, the essential question, paraphrasing the Pettkus analysis, is whether Mr. Suffern could have expected that Ms. Bystrowski would share the obligation to repay $45,000 to Stan Carter when the parties later liquidated all joint assets. [13] The key to determining that issue is to be found in the undisputed intention of both Mr. Suffern and Ms. Bystrowski to repay Mr. Carter from the proceeds of the townhouse sale. The problem, however, is that insufficient funds were available to pay the Carter debt when the townhouse was sold, otherwise Stan Carter would have been repaid at that time. [14] I accept the submission that Ms. Bystrowski should be required to share in paying Mr. Carter from monies realized from the sale of the trailer park and hobby farm. [15] In my view, Ms. Bystrowski received a benefit from the purchase of the three properties, Mr. Suffern suffered a corresponding deprivation by reason of his obligation to Stan Carter, and if Ms. Bystrowski is excused from responsibility for sharing in repayment the Carter debt she will have unjustly benefitted from profits made from the sale of the two Kootenay properties without assuming any liability for her share of the debt incurred to obtain that benefit. [16] Stan Carter has obtained judgment against Mr. Suffern for $52,086.52, plus costs of $789.57. Ms. Bystrowski must pay half of that, plus half of the interest incurred on the judgment. [17] Mr. Suffern is entitled to costs, on Scale 3. "Collver, J."