Date: 19980320 Docket: 32868 Registry: Prince George IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA BETWEEN: MONIKA ALEXANDRA ROERING PLAINTIFF AND: ROBERT GLEN NICHOLSON DEFENDANT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE KOENIGSBERG Counsel for the Plaintiff Marie Louise Ahrens Counsel for the Defendant Georialee A. Lang Place and Date of Hearing: Prince George, B.C. September 29-30, and October 1-3, 1997 I. Facts [1] The plaintiff, now age 39, is a schoolteacher. She has lived most of her life in Prince George. The defendant, age 44 is a lawyer. He grew up in Trail. [2] The parties met in 1983 and became romantically involved in 1986. The defendant separated from his wife in 1986 but did not officially divorce until the early 1990s. [3] In November 1986, the defendant purchased a house on McDonald Avenue in Prince George for approximately $83,000. Of that sum, approximately $30,000 came from the Defendant's funds, and the balance was financed. Immediately, or within a very short period of time, the plaintiff and defendant began living together in the McDonald Avenue house. At that time, the plaintiff had a Bachelor of Science degree, and was employed as a clerk at the Canadian Forest Products Pulp Mill earning approximately $25,000 per year. The defendant was a practicing lawyer earning approximately $48,000 per year. With the defendant's encouragement, the plaintiff left her employment at Canfor in the fall of 1988. The plaintiff's job was a dead-end job for her and the company was terminating that job. At the instance of the defendant, and with his assistance, the plaintiff commenced legal proceedings for constructive dismissal against Canfor. [4] The plaintiff was in receipt of Unemployment Insurance Benefits for eleven months thereafter. The parties continued living together and the plaintiff took part-time work and some classes. Finally, with the defendant's financial and emotional support, the plaintiff undertook a program necessary to obtain teaching credentials. The Canfor claim was settled in the spring of 1991 for approximately $10,000. [5] At the time, the plaintiff, who was temporarily resident at Simon Fraser University in Burnaby finishing her teacher training, allowed the defendant the use of $7,500 of the litigation proceeds to pay down the mortgage on the McDonald Avenue home. Over approximately the next six weeks, in two installments, the defendant returned the money to the plaintiff's bank account. Shortly thereafter, the final mortgage payment on the McDonald Avenue property was made. [6] In December 1991, the plaintiff completed her teacher training and commenced part-time employment as a teacher in January 1991. In September 1992, she obtained full-time teaching employment. [7] Once the plaintiff gained full-time employment as a teacher, the parties were in more prosperous circumstances. They had lived together at McDonald Avenue for approximately six years. The plaintiff had been wanting to live in rural property and keep horses. The defendant was prepared to share in that dream. He testified, and I accept, that the relationship had problems and he hoped this kind of move would solidify the couple. [8] In April 1994, the defendant purchased the Cranbrook Hill property, a large house on ten acres close to town. The McDonald Avenue home was sold contemporaneously, and the entire net sale proceeds were applied to the Cranbrook Hill purchase price of $283,000. [9] The balance of the Cranbrook Hill purchase price was secured by the defendant by way of a mortgage, which was paid off within the year from proceeds of a settlement of a dispute between the defendant and his previous law partnership. It is common ground that the plaintiff offered the defendant her cash savings at the time of purchase of $5,000 or $7,000 to contribute to the purchase price of the home. The defendant told the plaintiff to keep her money as it would be too insignificant a contribution to make a difference in the financing of the property. [10] The parties resided in the Cranbrook Hill home until the plaintiff left on August 12 1996, as the result of legal proceedings. Those proceedings had been commenced while the parties were still sharing the home. The defendant now says that their personal relationship was over in October 1995, and the plaintiff says it ended in January 1996. I find it makes no difference when the relationship ended; it was irrevocably broken by the end of 1995. [11] Upon leaving the Cranbrook Hill home, the plaintiff initially stayed with friends, housesat, and slept on about seven occasions in a borrowed van. On October 25, 1996, Master Doolan ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff spousal maintenance of $1,700 per month until further order of this court. [12] As of November 1996, the plaintiff rented a substantial three-bedroom detached home. She moved in June 1996, to a two- bedroom townhouse for financial reasons. [13] When the parties commenced cohabitation in 1986, the plaintiff had a little furniture, a 1978 Toyota Celica automobile, cash savings of just under $2,000, an R.R.S.P. of perhaps $1,800, and a job at Canfor where she earned approximately $25,000 per year. [14] The defendant also had some furnishings, $30,000 equity in the McDonald Avenue home, a 1982 Audi Coupe automobile, an older VW Rabbit, approximately $60,000 in R.R.S.P.'s, a lot in the Hart Highlands (which later sold for $20,000), a law partnership interest to which he had made an unquantified contribution by way of reduced salary since 1981, and cash savings of $2,948.09. [15] When the plaintiff moved out of the Cranbrook Hill home in the later summer of 1996, she had a teaching position earning $39,000 per year, a $25,000 personal R.R.S.P. in her name, a spousal R.R.S.P. then worth approximately $63,000 (ownership of which is claimed by the defendant), $13,000 worth of pension contributions and $7,000 cash with which to set up a new home. Her household and personal effects, horses, one dog and numerous equipment related to the animals were still in the home until November 1996. Besides the Cranbrook Hill property, a share of which is sought in this action, the parties acquired other assets during the nine or ten years of their relationship. However, these other assets were acquired by approximately equal financial contribution. [16] The defendant had in his name the Cranbook Hill house (then valued at $265,000), and significant assets listed in his Property and Financial Statement dated September 24, 1996. [17] The evidence is uncontradicted that in 1986 or early 1987 as the parties began to cohabit, the defendant felt considerable concern about what it would cost him to live in the newly purchased McDonald Avenue home. He expressed this concern to the plaintiff. He considered taking on a boarder, but the plaintiff felt a third person in the house would invade their privacy. He said on discovery that it was "a frightening amount of expense". He specifically did not want "rent" from the plaintiff, but he expected that she would contribute and she agreed to contribute to the cost of running the household. It is agreed that the cost of running the household included mortgage payments in the amount of approximately $500 per month, an allowance for property taxes in the amount of just over $90 per month, an allowance for city utilities of approximately $20 per month, $35 for hydro, $50 for natural gas and $300 for groceries. [18] The plaintiff's evidence is that the cost of running the household was in the neighbourhood of $1,000 per month, and that she agreed to contribute and did contribute money or money's worth in the amount of $500 per month. The defendant's evidence is that it cost more to run the household. He includes the cost to him of the use of his capital and costs for maintenance and repair. [19] From the beginning of the relationship the defendant kept careful track of all of his income and expenses. It was a long standing habit. He kept detailed records, updated every few months by hand. In 1988, he acquired a computer and his record- keeping became even more detailed. This habit was both known to the plaintiff and partially shared. That is, from the beginning of their cohabitation the defendant was able to outline to the plaintiff the state of his finances and how much he spent to maintain his household. The financial basis of their living together was set out with some precision. The plaintiff would contribute $500 per month as a significant contribution toward the lifestyle of the parties. The plaintiff, at that time earned approximately $25,000 per year and owned her own car. She also boarded a horse some 18 minutes drive from the residence. It was agreed $500 per month was what the plaintiff could afford. For that, all household expenses were paid by the defendant. The plaintiff was also encouraged to keep track of her expenses and apparently she did. For the first year or so of the relationship, there was first a monthly mutual accounting and then an accounting every few months with the plaintiff reporting what she had purchased for a given month and the defendant crediting her if she spent more than $500 and debiting her if she spent less toward the household. [20] The plaintiff sold her car in 1988 for over $4,000 and began driving one of the defendant's cars. The expense of her driving was absorbed into the $500 per month contribution. [21] The aforementioned accounting procedure endured throughout the relationship. Once on the computer, both parties had his and her own database for accounting purposes. The records of account at the time of trial were copious and detailed with computer printouts available for every kind of tally desired, for example, how much the plaintiff actually paid and what for, how much the defendant paid and what for, how much each home cost, the profit or loss incurred and the cost of maintenance and repair. [22] The parties shared household chores approximately equally. The defendant agreed that the plaintiff would loan him sums of money from time to time when he required cash for immediate purposes. He, of course, reimbursed her regularly in the monthly or quarterly accounting. The plaintiff says money went back and forth between them as required. She says that the accounting between the parties became "looser" as time went on. [23] The plaintiff disputed the accuracy of the records which showed at the end of an over nine year tally that the plaintiff owed the defendant money. However, while the records are obviously not flawless, they are likely accurate. Aside from whether they represent a precisely accurate financial reflection of the respective positions of the parties, they clearly represent a picture of an aspect of the relationship of the parties. The parties while living together, sharing their lives and some of their respective goals and dreams, did not commingle their financial lives such that either lost its identity. [24] Each of the parties has a different perspective on the meaning of the relationship. The plaintiff says it was a spousal relationship in which the defendant represented to her explicitly and implicitly that they were to share 50-50 in property and other assets. She says that on more than one occasion the defendant told her that while he did not wish to marry, they were in a relationship better than marriage, and that she had all the rights of a married woman. She testified that because the defendant was a lawyer, she relied on him and believed she did have such rights. The plaintiff says that in addition, when the parties moved to the Cranbrook Hill property, the defendant declared the property was one half hers. [25] The defendant denies he ever told the plaintiff she had all the rights of a married woman and he specifically denies that he ever told the plaintiff the Cranbrook Hill property was half hers. [26] I cannot accept, on all the evidence, that the defendant ever did make explicit or implicit representations to the plaintiff that any property to which she did not directly contribute about one-half the purchase price, was one-half hers. None of the defendant's actions are consistent with this. He kept track of contributions and reminded the plaintiff from time to time of her need to contribute substantially more than she otherwise was willing to do. Even in relation to the offer by the plaintiff of $5,000 or $7,000 as a lump sum contribution toward the purchase of the Cranbrook Hill property, the defendant did not say it wasn't necessary since she was entitled to one- half anyway. He said the contribution was too insignificant to be of much assistance in the purchase. He noted that the plaintiff would need her money for her expensive equestrian hobby. [27] The parties did not have joint bank accounts, credit cards, or other indica of a commingling of resources into a common pot. [28] The plaintiff says that the court should consider two pieces of evidence as corroboration of an explicit or implicit representation of the plaintiff having the full spousal rights of a married woman. First, a spousal R.R.S.P. was created in the plaintiff's name, contributed to solely by the defendant. These contributions amounted to over $48,000 by the time of trial. With interest this asset is now valued at over $60,000. [29] There is a trust agreement evidencing the understanding between the parties in relation to this spousal R.R.S.P. It refers to the parties as spouses and speaks of a common intention to retire together and make use of the fund so created. It also however, makes very clear that the monies do not belong, nor are they intended to belong, to the plaintiff. It is expressly stated in paragraphs six and seven of the Agreement made on 25 February 1993 that the authority over and ownership of the monies are the defendant's: 6. Monika will not use the Spousal Plan without the express authorization of Glen, and in particular will not make deposits to or withdrawals from the Spousal Plan without such authorization. 7. The deposit of funds into the Spousal Plan shall not be construed as a gift or transfer of ownership to Monika. [30] The defendant says indeed he was committed to the plaintiff by intention and if the relationship lasted into retirement he would obviously continue to be the most significant financial contributors to their household and lifestyle using, among other assets, the spousal R.R.S.P. [31] At first I found the notion of the spousal R.R.S.P. belonging solely to the defendant surprising. However, upon reflection and a careful reading of the trust document, I am satisfied it neither legally belongs to the plaintiff nor is it corroborative of representations made to her that she was entitled to it on the basis of rights accruing because of the parties' relationship. [32] The second piece of evidence said to demonstrate an intent to treat the plaintiff as legally in the position of a married woman, is the payment to her by the defendant's law corporation of the sum of $12,000 per year for the years 1994 and 1995, for bookkeeping services which she did not perform. This is apparently a well-known and accepted minor income-splitting device. In both this device and the spousal R.R.S.P., the plaintiff expressed to the defendant certain fears that she would unfairly bear a greater personal tax burden and until reassured in writing that the defendant would save her harmless for any increase in her taxes, she was reluctant to cooperate in either scheme. [33] This concern on the part of the plaintiff, to which she testified at trial, is hardly corroborative of a financially intertwined spousal relationship. If she had a right to be financially dependent on the defendant and was acquiring assets by virtue of the spousal relationship, then why should she be concerned about the tax implications? In fact, the upshot of the two transactions was that the plaintiff lost nothing. She gained approximately $14,000 over two years (after tax) from the income splitting and the defendant gained a tax advantage. The relationship had ended by the time of the 1995 $12,000 payment. The plaintiff returned the defendant's cheque and he credited it to what he claimed was her loan account with him reducing her indebtedness to him to under $3,000. [34] The plaintiff's contribution of approximately $500 per month continued, according to the defendant, until 1991, when she was a full-time student and not in receipt of any income. The plaintiff contributed approximately $2,200 to refurbishing his Audi in that year, however. That year also, he received the use of her $7,500 litigation proceeds for a period of four to six weeks. [35] The parties agree that the plaintiff recommenced household contribution when she became employed as a teacher, but they disagree as to the amount of her contribution and as to which items of undoubted expenditure were for the agreed benefit of the joint household. The evidence of the defendant is that the plaintiff agreed to begin contributing $700 of money or money's worth per month to the joint household expenses when she gained full-time employment as a teacher. The plaintiff says that the $700 figure was arbitrary and not agreed to by her. By the end of the relationship, according to the records of the defendant, she was some $2,700 in "arrears" of contributions, based on his attributions of expense items over the entire period of the relationship nearly ten years. [36] It is not insignificant in the context of characterizing the nature of the parties' relationship and their respective expectations of one another that the plaintiff did not think that once she was earning approximately $39,000 per year that contributing $700 per month to their joint lifestyle was fair. She says she did not willingly agree to pay it. She admitted that the lifestyle they enjoyed, at least by 1994, involved pursuing her goals of rural living including keeping horses and expensive dogs. Today, the plaintiff is earning over $40,000 per year with a net income of approximately $2,072 per month. She is looking after one dog, one horse and paying rent and says she cannot survive on her salary. Thus, the distance between Ms,. Roering's expectations of a reasonable financial contribution to a particular lifestyle, i,e, $500 - $700 per month, and its actual cost is considerable. In 1997, Ms. Roering's expenses for the keeping and care of one horse and one dog was nearly $750 per month. II. Analysis [37] On the basis of the relationship between the parties, the plaintiff claims a one-half interest in the Cranbrook Hill property as well as other assets. There are two complementary bases advanced for these claims: Constructive Trust and Proprietary Estoppel. A. Cranbrook Hill Property (1) Constructive Trust [38] The plaintiff relies in large part on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Peter v. Beblow (1993), 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.) and decisions following it. [39] In Peter v. Beblow, the Court engaged in a detailed analysis of the three elements of unjust enrichment as they might apply to a common law relationship. [40] In the reasons for judgment of McLachlin J. for the majority, she began with the following observations at page 5: In recent decades, Canadian courts have adopted the equitable concept of unjust enrichment inter alia as the basis for remedying the injustice that occurs where one person makes a substantial contribution to the property of another person without compensation. The doctrine has been applied to a variety of situations, from claims for payments made under mistake to claims arising from conjugal relationships. While courts have not been adverse to applying the concept of unjust enrichment in new circumstances, they have insisted on adhering to the fundamental principles which have long underlain the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. As stated by La Forest J.A. (as he then was) in White v. Central Trust Co. (1984), 7 D.L.R. (4th) 236 , at p. 246, "... the well recognized categories of unjust enrichment must be regarded as clear examples of the more general principle that transcends them." . . . Notwithstanding these rather straightforward doctrinal underpinnings, their application has sometimes given rise to difficulty. there is a tendency on the part of some to view the action for unjust enrichment as a device for doing whatever may seem fair between the parties. In the rush to substantive justice, the principles are sometimes forgotten. Policy issues often assume a large role, infusing such straightforward discussions as whether there was a "benefit" to the defendant or a "detriment" to the plaintiff. On the remedies side, the requirements of the special proprietary remedy of constructive trust are sometimes minimized. As Professor Palmer has said: "The constructive trust idea stirs the judicial imagination in ways that assumpsit, quantum meruit and other terms associated with quasi-contract have never quite succeeded in duplicating" (G.E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution, vol. 1, at p. 16). Occasionally the remedial notion of constructive trust is even conflated with unjust enrichment itself, as though where one is found the other must follow. For his part Cory J. dealt with the elements in this way (at 23): 1. Enrichment It should not be forgotten that the trial judge specifically found that there had been an enrichment to the respondent "since he obtained the services of the plaintiff as a housekeeper, homemaker and in fact step- mother without compensation." Indeed, it was conceded before us that the respondent was enriched by the work and contributions of the appellant. 2. A Corresponding Deprivation It is again important to first consider the finding of the trial judge on this issue. He stated: ... the plaintiff was deprived of any compensation for her labour since she devoted the majority of her time and energy and some of the monies she earned towards the benefit of the respondent, his children and his property. That finding would seem sufficient in itself to warrant the conclusion that the appellant suffered a deprivation which corresponds to the enrichment of the respondent. Indeed, I would have thought that if there is enrichment, that it would almost invariably follow that there is a corresponding deprivation suffered by the person who provided the enrichment. There is ample support for the proposition that once enrichment has been found, the conclusion that the plaintiff has suffered a corresponding deprivation is virtually automatic: In Sorochan, supra, Dickson C.J. suggested that benefit and deprivation are essentially two sides of the same coin. He wrote at pp. 45-46: Moreover, the case law indicates that the full-time devotion of one's labour and earnings without compensation can readily be viewed as a deprivation. In Murray v. Roty, 41 O.R. (2d) 705 (Ont. C.A.), for example, a case involving a joint business and farm operation, Cory J.A., commented ( at p. 710): "For eight years of her life she devoted all of her time and energy and almost all of her wages for the benefit of Roty. The deprivation is obvious". In Everson v. Rich (1988), 16 R.F.L. (3d) 337, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, applying Sorochan, stated at p. 342: The spousal services provided by the appellant were valuable services and did constitute a benefit conferred upon the respondent. The provision of those services was a detriment to the claimant by virtue of the use of her time and energy. I agree with his reasoning. As a general rule, if it is found that the defendant has been enriched by the efforts of the plaintiff there will, almost as a matter of course, be deprivation suffered by the plaintiff. As Professor James McLeod pointed out ((1988), 16 R.F.L. (3d) 338) in his annotation of Everson v. Rich, supra, "the deprivation requirement is satisfied by showing the plaintiff expended effort or does not have what he/she had or might have had." Particularly in a matrimonial or long term common law relationship it should, in the absence of cogent evidence to the contrary, be taken that the enrichment of one party will result in a deprivation of the other. [41] In Ford v. Werden (1996), 27 B.C.L.R. (3d) 169 (C.A.), Newbury J.A., analyzing these passages from Peter v. Beblow said this (at 176): It is not clear to me whether the majority of the Court intended to endorse this approach and to lay down as a rule that spousal services must generally be assumed to have benefitted one party to the deprivation of the other. Taken to its logical conclusion, this would mean that in a relationship between two adults each of whom has provided spousal services to the other, each must be assumed to have benefitted and to have suffered a deprivation at the same time. The first to sue will have an obvious advantage in that he or she will be assumed to have suffered a deprivation, and the defendant will be compelled to make a counterclaim on exactly the same basis. (This in fact is what one commentator assumes was intended: see K. Farquhar, "Unjust Enrichment - Special Relationship - Domestic Services - Remedial Constructive Trusts: Peter v. Beblow", (1993) 72 Can. Bar. Rev. 538 at 541.) . . . In any event, the fact that "spousal services" can be and are now regarded by Canadian courts as valuable and compensable does not in my view remove the necessity of determining on the facts of each case whether there is no juristic reason for the enrichment i.e., whether the enrichment is "unjust" or, in the terms advanced by Cory, J., whether one party's expectation to share in the other's property is a "legitimate" one. In situations involving "traditional" common law marriages, these are not difficult questions the court is generally confronted with one party (usually a woman) who has subverted her economic independence to the greater good of the family, foregoing opportunities to maximize her own income stream or asset base in the expectation that the relationship will last and she will be in a position to share in the income stream of her husband and in the appreciation of his assets. The courts rightly regard it as unjust to permit the husband thereafter to walk away from the relationship, taking with him all his assets and his entire income stream, enlarged or improved as it is by the common law wife's efforts. It is a different matter, however, to apply these assumptions to relationships that are not the stereotypical or "traditional" type of common law marriage. If one considers the three factors suggested by McLachlin, J. at p. 990-1 of Peter v. Beblow, distinct differences are apparent. In these non- traditional relationships, each party confers "benefits" on the other without expecting to be paid except perhaps in kind by reciprocal services. The very nature of the relationship as a kind of partnership between two independent persons necessarily implies mutual duties and obligations that for legal purposes might be described as "gifts" in the sense that they are rendered outside of the realm of contractual, common law, equitable or statutory obligation and without a known expectation of compensation. A clearer example (in the sense that it is less clouded with moral and policy considerations) of such a relationship occurs where two persons room together and divide the household tasks between them; the law does not, as far as I know, permit one to sue the other for the "benefits" conferred, even though they are not conferred pursuant to a legal obligation. In this context, neither person expects to compensate or to be compensated. Since there is no question concerning a compromise of the defendant's claim in this case, I move to the third factor mentioned by McLachlin, J. whether public policy favours some form of restitution. In British Columbia, the legislature has enacted the Family Relations Act to provide married persons with property claims and interests in "family property". This statute presumes that equal entitlement will generally be the fair resolution of those claims. The legislature has not done the same with respect to common law spouses or other adults living together. Nor has a rule developed at common law that whenever two adults live together, they thereby acquire claims to or interests in each other's property. Overall, it is my view that there is no "unjustness" that needs to be remedied in the circumstances by the imposition of a special rule pr presumption not found in the general law of unjust enrichment, and that ultimately, the analysis should involve a close examination of the facts in each case. In Peter v. Beblow and the cases following it, it is most important to keep in mind that the relationship between the parties was one of significant imbalance with the husband not only a greater financial earner, but the wife forgoing a career and acquisition of assets on her own account in order to sustain the relationship and provide the spousal services demanded. [42] As I understand the matter, when analyzing a common law relationship for unjust enrichment leading to a remedy of a constructive trust, two circumstances are apparent: 1) the matter is fact driven; and 2) a close analysis must be undertaken of exactly what expectations were reasonably created by the conduct of the parties to a relationship when acquiring property and other assets. [43] In my view, this fact situation could not give rise to a reasonable expectation of a share in the property of the defendant by the plaintiff. First, the defendant's conduct throughout was to keep track, with the plaintiff's knowledge, of contributions to the lifestyle of the parties. A contribution to that lifestyle was demanded and discussed. Second, no dependency was created. The defendant encouraged and supported the plaintiff in becoming more economically independent and at his expense she improved her career opportunities. Third, at no time did the defendant lead the plaintiff to expect that she was to share equally or at all in property interests unless she was able to contribute substantially financially to the acquisition of assets, which she was not. [44] This is not a case in which the defendant exploited the plaintiff in order to obtain spousal services, thus allowing the defendant to accumulate assets while the plaintiff expended her efforts to build and maintain a family life. In a sense, a reasonable assessment of the relationship was that the defendant, to his financial and emotional detriment, subrogated his goals of an independent lifestyle allowing for outdoor activities (i.e. hiking, kayaking, etc.) free of substantial property obligations to accommodate the plaintiff's dream (which she could not afford on her own) of living on a large rural property, and raising horses and dogs and engaging in time-consuming and resource consuming gardening. [45] The parties clearly had a spousal-like relationship. They lived together sharing much of their lives for almost ten years. But in no sense, did either, intentionally or inadvertently, relinquish financial or career independence in order to maintain the relationship. Quite the contrary, the plaintiff was able to change careers for the better. Further, the plaintiff was able, because of the financial support of the defendant, to pursue expensive hobbies, particularly the keeping of horses, attend school, live in a comfortable house and accumulate assets. [46] To place the facts of this case within the principles of Peter v. Beblow is to advance the law from valuing spousal services when given to the detriment of the giver to simply creating property interests based on the establishment of a common law relationship. That is not my understanding of the law. Clearly then, I can find no enrichment of the defendant, nor a corresponding detriment to the plaintiff. (2) Proprietary Estoppel [47] The plaintiff put forward this basis for recovery on two grounds: 1) verbal representations and 2) documentary representation. The plaintiff relies on certain verbal representations that were made to her by the defendant about her legal rights. The plaintiff says where credibility is an issue, as here, I should find in favor of the plaintiff. [48] I found both parties to be sincere and strongly committed to his or her version of the relationship. Each truly believes their perception of things was the most accurate. Each demonstrated a significant degree of egocentrism in approaching their relationship. [49] I find however, that the defendant is a more accurate reporter of what likely happened. While his reflective, introspective and well-defined ideas of relationships and marriage, as well as his meticulous approach to recording the cost and benefits of daily living were an irritant to the plaintiff, he was far less inclined than the plaintiff to see things as he wanted to see them. [50] The plaintiff's failure to grasp the financial realities of life as well as to appreciate the extent to which realizing her dreams and desires meant compromising the defendant's, were no doubt an irritant to the defendant. Those qualities contributed however, to the conclusion that the plaintiff heard "representation of legal rights" when assurances of commitment to a relationship were given. The plaintiff accepted as "hers by right", that which the defendant explicitly and implicitly gave as a means of trying to share a life and maintain the commitment. As between the two, when it comes to reporting what actually happened or what was actually said, I accept the evidence of the defendant over that of the plaintiff. [51] I have already found that I do not accept the evidence that these representations were made. While no doubt, over the course of the many years of this relationship, the defendant gave the plaintiff many assurances of his love for her and commitment to their relationship, on the whole of the evidence, I cannot find that the specific alleged verbal representations were made. [52] However, the plaintiff says she did not rely on the defendant's words alone. She also relies on documentary representations. The following are the factors on which the plaintiff relies as leading reasonably to proprietary estoppel: 1) Mr. Nicholson persuaded Ms. Roering to participate in a spousal R.R.S.P. trust arrangement explicitly premised upon them being "woman and husband" and planning for a common retirement; 2) Mr. Nicholson drafted what might be called mutual wills -- she left him everything and he left her a significant part of his property; 3) Mr. Nicholson shared his income with Ms. Roering - - he caused his law corporation to pay her $12,000 per year from the revenues of his law practice for doing no work. This happened in the years 1994 and 1995 as the relationship was ending. In fact, Mr. Nicholson paid Ms. Roering the second year the full sum of $12,000 at the very end of 1995, a couple of months after he says the relationship actually ended; 4) The parties referred to each other as "husband" and "wife" in the presence of each other to third parties; 5) Mr. Nicholson encouraged Ms. Roering to give up her Canfor job, and supported her while she resumed her education; 6) Ms. Roering relied on Mr. Nicholson specifically for legal advice throughout the relationship. He confirms this in his discovery evidence and says this was one of his benefits to her. He knew she relied on him. Every time something came up in her life that touched her legal rights, she put herself into his hands -- the Canfor wrongful dismissal suit "fronted" by another lawyer and conducted by Mr. Nicholson; the UI appeal; the spousal R.R.S.P. trust document; 7) Ms. Roering testified that about 18 months into the relationship she felt a need for commitment and direction -- essentially for security in the relationship. Even on Mr. Nicholson's evidence -- that he was just as committed to her as any married spouse - - she got that assurance; [53] The plaintiff says the evidence as a whole supports her characterization of the relationship. She says she received assurances, and says her behaviour speaks to her belief in, and her reliance on, her position in life being that of a wife, a full partner. She says she didn't spend her money as a single person would have. Further, says the plaintiff, Mr. Nicholson says he tracked everything. He knew what she was doing and he didn't disabuse her. But in the end says the plaintiff, it doesn't matter whether he was mistaken in what he assured her, or whether he intended to mislead her, or whether she misunderstood him. What is critical is that she relied on what he held out. [54] The plaintiff relies on Zelmer v. Victor Projects Ltd. (1997), 34 B.C.L.R. (3d) 125 (C.A.) to ground this claim on these facts in proprietary estoppel. In that case, as in all others with such a claim, it is necessary to find that Ms. Roering acted on her induced belief to her detriment. I can make no such finding. [55] However, I find that Ms. Roering could not have reasonably believed on the basis of what was said to her and the actions of the defendant in income splitting, in preparing the spousal R.R.S.P. trust document and the wills; and the other matters as set out above; that the defendant intended her to have an interest in assets to which she made no significant contribution. But, even more importantly, if she did so reasonably believe, she suffered no detriment. She is financially considerably better off as a result of the relationship with Mr. Nicholson than she was when she began it. She gave up nothing and gained a more remunerable and fulfilling career. [56] The plaintiff's claim for a 50% interest or any interest in the Cranbrook Hill property is dismissed. Other Assets [57] There are other assets with respect to which the plaintiff seeks specific orders: 1) The 1982 Audi [58] This car has been in the plaintiff's possession since November 1996 by consent order. It is now 15 years old, and it has been driven in Prince George winters. The plaintiff made a major contribution of $2,200 to the vehicle in 1991 when she was a student. The plaintiff seeks an order that she is the sole owner of this vehicle. On the basis that the value may not exceed by much the financial contribution made to it by the plaintiff, the plaintiff is the sole owner of the 1982 Audi. 2) The Piano [59] This instrument has been in the plaintiff's possession since November 1996. The piano was purchased second-hand by the parties and each paid half the original cost of approximately $9,500 each. The plaintiff says the instrument has held its value. The defendant says the instrument has doubled its value. The plaintiff submits that her position on value is more probable. The plaintiff says that the defendant has retained substantially all of the remaining jointly-owned items, including the dining room suite, crystal chosen by the plaintiff and her mother, the serving pieces which match the plaintiff's flatware. In addition he has purchased a new piano since separation with assets at issue in these proceedings. Thus the plaintiff seeks an order that she is the sole owner of the piano. It is not possible, on the evidence to determine the value of the piano. There is no reasonable basis to transfer almost $10,000 in value to the plaintiff. The piano should be sold and the value divided 50-50 between the parties. Other Jointly Owned Assets [60] The parties shall divide either in value or by lot the other jointly owned assets as set out at Tab 36, Exhibit 2. The Spousal R.R.S.P. [61] In the circumstances, the plaintiff seeks a declaration that the transfer agreement is void and that she is the owner of the spousal R.R.S.P. The spousal R.R.S.P. is the subject of a trust agreement. There is no basis to declare the trust agreement void. The R.R.S.P. belongs to the defendant. The plaintiff will cooperate in transferring by reasonable means the spousal R.R.S.P. to the defendant. He will save her harmless from any cost thereof. Spousal Maintenance [62] On appeal, Mr. Justice Sigurdson confirmed Master Doolan's order that the plaintiff was entitled to interim maintenance while she awaited judgment of the property and other claims. The order of October 25, 1997, specifically provides that maintenance be paid until further order of this court. There is no basis on the evidence to make a permanent order for spousal maintenance. Consent Restraining Order [63] The mutual consent restraining order made November 1, 1996, is vacated by consent. Photographic Slides [64] The defendant's counterclaim for return of photographic slides is dismissed. There is no basis upon which the court can find the plaintiff has the slides. IV. Costs [65] The parties have liberty to speak to costs. "Koenigsberg, J." Koenigsberg, J. Vancouver, British Columbia March 20, 1998