IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
Howe v. 3770010 Canada Inc.,
2008 BCSC 330
Howe and Sandra Jones and Cathy Ball
and Colleen Dunstan and Claude Himbeault
and Shelly & Steve Porter, Tennille Caissie and
Peter & Eula Sagagskie
Inc. and Sylvain Carle and
James Pollock and Jamison Pollock
Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Gerow
Reasons for Judgment
Counsel for the Petitioners:
Counsel for the Respondents:
Date and Place of Hearing:
February 15, 2008
 The petitioners appeal a decision of an Arbitrator that Notices to End Tenancies (the “Notices”) served by the landlord on them were valid, and seek an order that the landlord is prohibited from serving further notices to end the petitioners’ tenancies. The petitioners are tenants who own manufactured homes in a park known as the Bellendean Manufactured Home Park (the “Park”). The respondent 3770010 Canada Inc. (“3770010”) purchased the Park in April 2005. On January 25, 2007, the petitioners were served with Notices by 3770010 pursuant to ss. 42 and 44 of the Manufactured Home Park Tenancy Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 77 (the “MHPTA”). The petitioners disputed the Notices and a hearing was conducted before an Arbitrator between the petitioners and 3770010. On August 10, 2007, the Arbitrator issued a Decision and Reasons (the “Decision”) declining to set aside the Notices and issuing orders for possession effective February 29, 2008. The petitioners assert that the Arbitrator erred in law in finding that the respondents were entitled to serve the Notices on the petitioners without having permits and approvals. They seek an order setting aside the orders for possession, and an injunction restraining the respondents from issuing further Notices to End Tenancies to them pursuant to s. 42 of the MHPTA until further order of the Court. It is unclear why the petitioners have named the other respondents as it is clear from the material filed that 3770010 is the landlord and the respondent that issued the Notices. The petitioners advanced no arguments regarding the other respondents.
 The issues are:
1. What is the appropriate standard of review?
2. Applying the appropriate standard of review, should the Decision be set aside?
3. Are the petitioners entitled to an injunction prohibiting 3770010 from issuing further Notices to End Tenancies to them until further order of the Court?
 The petitioners are five tenants who own manufactured homes that have been in place in the Park since at least the 1970s. The Park consists of 12 pads. Some of the petitioners have made significant improvements to the homes and some are on concrete poured foundations.
 In January 2007, the respondent 3770010 served Notices to the petitioners pursuant to s. 42(1) of the MHPTA which provides:
Subject to section 44 [tenant's compensation: section 42 notice], a landlord may end a tenancy agreement by giving notice to end the tenancy agreement if the landlord has all the necessary permits and approvals required by law, and intends in good faith, to convert all or a significant part of the manufactured home park to a non-residential use or a residential use other than a manufactured home park.
 Eight of the tenants applied to set aside the Notices under the MHPTA and the Residential Tenancy Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 78. A four day hearing was conducted on March 5, April 16, May 28 and July 11, 2007. The tenants and the landlord, 3770010, were represented by counsel.
 The Arbitrator issued the Decision in which she declined to set aside the Notices and granted orders of possession effective February 29, 2008 pursuant to s. 48 of the MHPTA.
 In the Decision, the Arbitrator accepted 3770010’s position that the operation of the Park was no longer financially viable, and that 3770010 intended to close the Park in order to build a single family residence on the property. The Arbitrator accepted the petitioners’ position that many of the manufactured homes could not be moved and that all the petitioners would suffer a significant financial loss if the tenancies ended.
 In the Decision, the Arbitrator stated the following:
All evidence was carefully considered and on the basis of the information before me I accept that the landlord intends, in good faith, to convert the manufactured home park to a residential use other than a manufactured home park. I am satisfied that the landlord is not required to have any permits or approvals to close the Park. Although the landlord requires permits and approvals to build a house on the property I heard from the Deputy Manager of Development Services, Cowichan Valley Regional District, that an application to construct a house would not be accepted until the landlord ceases to operate the legal non-conforming Manufactured Home Park.
Although I noted the tenant’s arguments disputing the landlord’s good faith intention I am satisfied that the requirement for good faith relates to the landlord’s intention to convert the Manufactured Home Park to “a residential use other than a manufactured home park”. I am not persuaded that the landlord is required by law to have an intention – good faith or otherwise – for the eventual use of the land.
Being satisfied that the landlord intends to convert the manufactured home park to a residential use other than a manufactured home park I must decline to set aside the subject notices.
What is the appropriate standard of review?
 I have concluded that the appropriate standard of review to be applied is reasonableness.
 The petitioners argue that the appropriate standard of review to be applied is correctness as the Arbitrator erred in law in her interpretation of s. 42(1) of the MHPTA. The petitioners assert they had a right under s. 51 of the MHPTA to go directly to court without first submitting to the arbitration process. They submit that because of the ability to go directly to the Supreme Court for relief, the standard for review is correctness. The petitioners argue that another factor that weighs in favour of the standard of review being correctness is that they have commenced an action in the Supreme Court in contract, tort and equity.
 In that regard they rely on s. 51 of the MHPTA which provides:
(1) Except as restricted under this Act, a person may make an application to the director for dispute resolution in relation to a dispute with the person’s landlord or tenant in respect of any of the following:
(a) rights, obligations and prohibitions under this Act;
(b) rights and obligations under the terms of a tenancy agreement that
(i) are required or prohibited under this Act, or
(ii) relate to
(A) the tenant's use, occupation or maintenance of the manufactured home site, or
(B) the use of common areas or services or facilities.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (4), if the director receives an application under subsection (1), the director must determine the dispute unless
(a) the claim is for more than the monetary limit for claims under the Small Claims Act,
(b) the application was not made within the applicable period specified under this Act, or
(c) the dispute is linked substantially to a matter that is before the Supreme Court.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (4), a court does not have and must not exercise any jurisdiction in respect of a matter that must be submitted for determination by the director under this Act.
(4) The Supreme Court may
(a) on application, hear a dispute referred to in subsection (2)(a) or (c), and
(b) on hearing the dispute, make any order that the director may make under this Act.
(5) The Commercial Arbitration Act does not apply to a dispute resolution proceeding.
 Section 51(2)(a) has no application to this matter as the petitioners’ claim is for a declaration, not for damages. Although the petitioners assert that this matter is linked to an action they have commenced in the Supreme Court, no pleadings were before either the Arbitrator or this Court, and the respondents say they have not been served with any action. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that s. 51(2)(c) does not apply, and that this matter falls within s. 51(3).
 Section 71.1 of the MHPTA incorporates ss. 56 to 58 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45 (the “ATA”). Section 58 of the ATA provides:
(1) If the tribunal's enabling Act contains a privative clause, relative to the courts the tribunal must be considered to be an expert tribunal in relation to all matters over which it has exclusive jurisdiction.
(2) In a judicial review proceeding relating to expert tribunals under subsection (1)
(a) a finding of fact or law or an exercise of discretion by the tribunal in respect of a matter over which it has exclusive jurisdiction under a privative clause must not be interfered with unless it is patently unreasonable,
(b) questions about the application of common law rules of natural justice and procedural fairness must be decided having regard to whether, in all of the circumstances, the tribunal acted fairly, and
(c) for all matters other than those identified in paragraphs (a) and (b), the standard of review to be applied to the tribunal's decision is correctness.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a), a discretionary decision is patently unreasonable if the discretion
(a) is exercised arbitrarily or in bad faith,
(b) is exercised for an improper purpose,
(c) is based entirely or predominantly on irrelevant factors, or
(d) fails to take statutory requirements into account.
 The MHPTA includes a privative clause at s. 70(3) that: “Except as otherwise provided in this Act, a decision or order of the director is final and binding on the parties.”
 The petitioners argue that the decision of the Arbitrator falls under s. 58(2)(c) of the ATA because it is based on statutory interpretation and statutory interpretation is not within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. However, the MHPTA gives the director authority to determine issues of fact or law in s. 55(2). Section 55(2) provides: “[t]he director may make any finding of fact or law that is necessary or incidental to a making a decision or an order under this Act.”
 It is apparent from the Decision that the Arbitrator made findings of fact and law in deciding not to aside the Notices. Accordingly, I have concluded that s. 58(2)(a) of the ATA applies.
 Although the petitioners argue that the definition of patently unreasonable in s. 58(3) applies, that definition is limited to discretionary decisions. As a result, one must look to the common law for the definition of patently unreasonable.
 The Supreme Court of Canada has recently considered the issue of what standards of review should be applied in judicial review in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9. The Court concluded at ¶45 that the two standards of patently unreasonable and reasonableness simpliciter should be collapsed into a single form of “reasonableness” review. The result is two standards of judicial review – reasonableness and correctness.
 In reviewing a decision for reasonableness, a court should be concerned with both the reasons and the outcomes. As set out at ¶47:
In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law.
Should the Arbitrator’s decision be set aside on the basis that it was unreasonable?
 The petitioners assert that even if the standard of review is patently unreasonable, the Arbitrator’s decision should be set aside. They argue that the Arbitrator erred in law when she found that the “necessary permits and approvals required by law” were limited to permits and approvals required to close the Park. They submit that the landlord did not have the required permits because it did not have the building permit that is required to build a residence on the site, nor did it have the permits required to move the manufactured homes from the Park.
 The petitioners say that the permits and approvals contemplated in s. 42 of the MHPTA should be read narrowly, and in the context of s. 44. Section 44 of the MHPTA provides:
(1) A landlord who gives a tenant notice to end a tenancy under section 42 [landlord's use of property] must pay the tenant, on or before the effective date of the notice, an amount that is equivalent to 12 months' rent payable under the tenancy agreement.
(2) In addition to the amount payable under subsection (1), if steps have not been taken to accomplish the stated purpose for ending the tenancy under section 42 within a reasonable period after the effective date of the notice, the landlord must pay the tenant an amount that is the equivalent of 6 times the monthly rent payable under the tenancy agreement.
 The petitioners submit that there are two possible purposes for ending the tenancy – a broad purpose and a narrow purpose. The broad purpose is to change the Park to a “residential use other than a manufactured home park”. The narrow purpose is 3770010’s “stated purpose”, which is to build a residence on the land. The petitioners argue that in order to be able to make a determination under s. 44, i.e. whether “steps have not been taken to accomplish the stated purpose for ending the tenancy under s. 42 within a reasonable time period” pursuant to s. 44(2), the nature of the permits and approvals must be linked to the narrow purpose of the proposed use of the Park, otherwise it would be impossible to know what permits and approvals were required. The petitioners submit that the drafters of the legislation have not stated that the “necessary permits and approvals” are to be linked to the closing of the Park, and if the intent was that the permits and approvals are to simply to change the use of the Park they would have said that.
 The petitioners argue that proper statutory interpretation would preclude the meaning provided by the Arbitrator, notwithstanding the fact that there are actually more permits and approvals required before the manufactured homes can be moved under the Manufactured Home Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 75, ss. 15(1)(b) and (2)(b). Those sections deal with a transport permit to move manufactured homes, and the right of the landlord for possession if a manufactured home is abandoned.
 In support of their submissions the petitioners point to the former section of the Residential Tenancy Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 365 dealing with the notice to vacate a manufactured home park which provided:
17(1) Notwithstanding section 15, where a landlord bona fide intends to occupy, or use residential premises for the purpose of …
(e) converting it into something other than residential premises occupied under a tenancy agreement …
the landlord shall give not less than 119 days notice of termination of the existing tenancy agreement, to be effective as specified on section 15 or, where the tenancy has a predetermined expiry date, on that date.
(2) Where the approval of a municipality, regional district or the Minister of Municipal Affairs is required before doing one of the things referred to in subsection (1), the approval must be obtained before a notice may be given under subsection (1) unless the rentalsman, before or after the notice is given, and on conditions he considers appropriate, orders otherwise.
 The petitioners submit that the word “permit” was not included in the earlier legislation and that the legislation contemplated only a possibility of municipal approval. They say that the language of the MHPTA is different in that the word “permit” is now specifically included, and therefore, there is a requirement for building permits and all other permits that are required. They argue that the Arbitrator erred in law when she did not require 3770010 to have a building permit for its stated intended use of the property, i.e. building a residence, prior to serving the Notices.
 In North Shore Motels (1977) Ltd. v. Gould,  B.C.J. No. 1044 (S.C.), aff’d  B.C.J. No. 112 (C.A.), McLachlin L.J.S.C. (as she then was) considered the wording of s. 17 of the Residential Tenancy Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 365. The case involved a property which was occupied by both a motel and a mobile home park. The entire property was zoned for tourist or commercial use. The landlord served notices of termination to the tenants of the mobile home park. The rentalsman held that even though the landlord bona fide intended to occupy or use the residential premises for a purpose which complied with the Residential Tenancy Act, the termination notices were invalid because the landlord had failed to obtain the prior approval of the municipality. The rentalsman was of the view that the word “approval” meant something more than appropriate zoning. The issue before the Court was whether the “approval” required in s. 17(2) required the landlord to obtain municipal consent to the proposed construction prior to serving termination notices on the tenants.
 In finding that the required approvals related to the change in use such as zoning changes, McLachlin L.J.S.C. stated at ¶11:
It is important to note that the approval in question is not approval of a construction project, but rather approval required for conversion from residential premises to other premises, in this case tourist-commercial premises. Alteration of existing premises is not inevitably associated with a change from residential to non-residential use. Consider the example of what are often referred to as apartment hotels. Such buildings are often constructed with a view to operation as residential premises for a time, after which they will be used as tourist-commercial premises, without further alterations. Similarly, while it would be unlikely, it might be entirely possible for the Landlord in the case at bar to operate tourist facilities out of mobile homes on its property without ever obtaining municipal consent to new construction. These examples illustrate that conversion of residential premises to other premises - the conversion contemplated by Section 17(1)(e) - does not necessarily entail alteration of the physical premises. While new construction often takes place in such circumstances, it is incidental to the change of use to which Section 17(1)(e) refers. It follows that "approval” in Section 17(2) as applied to Section 17(1)(e) should not be read as referring to physical changes or new construction, but rather the change in use, such as zoning changes. Since the land is presently zoned for commercial/tourist use, no further approval is required. The Rentalsman, by requiring that "the municipality through the building inspector must give some form of positive indication that the Landlord may construct the motel extension" erred in law by treating Section 17(1)(e) as though it referred to physical changes involving new construction rather than changes in use.
 The Arbitrator reached a similar conclusion in this case. The Arbitrator concluded that the necessary permits and approvals were those required to convert the Park to a residential use other than a manufactured home park, i.e. for the change in use.
 The petitioners assert that the Arbitrator erred in law in considering the discretionary policy position of the Cowichan Valley Regional District, i.e. that it would not provide building permits unless the Park was closed, as proof that no permits and approvals were necessary to redevelop the land to something other than a manufactured home park. However, the Decision does not state that is the basis for finding that no permits and approvals were necessary to close the Park.
 The Arbitrator had evidence before her from the Cowichan Valley Regional District that the property in issue is zoned as partly C1 (Commercial Zoning) and partly R3 (Residential Zoning). The Park is located wholly on the area zoned as R3. The R3 zoning allows single family residential dwellings. There is a minimum lot size but no maximum lot size for R3 zoning. The only requirements to build a single family dwelling are that the owner obtain a building permit, meet the requirements in the building permit for provision of water and sewer, and that the dwelling meets the appropriate setbacks. In other words, there was no requirement for a change of zoning to change the use of or convert the property to a residential use other than a manufactured home park.
 The petitioners submit that North Shore Motels (1977) Ltd. v. Gould is distinguishable because the earlier legislation only used the word “approval” and that the inclusion of the word “permit” in s. 42(1) of the MHTPA means that 3770010 must also obtain a building permit prior to issuing the Notices.
 I am not persuaded that the narrow reading urged by the petitioners is appropriate. For example, the petitioners argue that 3770010 did not comply with the requirement to obtain permits to move the homes under the Manufactured Home Act prior to serving the Notices under s. 42(1) of the MHPTA. However, under s. 15 of the Manufactured Home Act, it is the owner of the manufactured home who is to apply for the permit and the landlord is only entitled to obtain the transportation permit in the event that the home is under an order of possession or the landlord is exercising a right respecting disposal of abandoned personal property. Pursuant to s. 17(1) of the Manufactured Home Act, a transport permit expires 30 days after it is issued. That cannot be the type of permit referred to in s. 42(1) of the MHPTA as under s. 42(2) the notice to end tenancy is not effective earlier than 12 months after the date the notice is received, or if the tenancy agreement is fixed term, no earlier than the date specified as the end of the tenancy.
 Section 42(1) of the MHPTA refers to “all the necessary permits and approvals required by law … to convert all or a significant part of the manufactured home park to … a residential use other than a manufactured home park.” In my view, the reasoning in North Shore Motels (1977) Ltd. v. Gould applies in this case. The plain meaning of the words in s. 42 is that the approvals and permits are those that are required to convert or change the use of the property to a residential use other than a manufactured home park.
 In this case, the Arbitrator was satisfied that there were no further permits or approvals required in order for the property to be converted to a residential use other than a manufactured home park.
 The role of the Court is limited in this case and is to determine whether the Decision was unreasonable. In the Decision, the reasons for the Arbitrator’s findings are set out in an intelligible fashion. For the reasons set out above, it is my view that the Decision falls within the range of outcomes which are defensible on the facts and the law. Accordingly, I cannot say the Decision should be set aside on the basis that it is unreasonable.
 Having determined that the Decision should not be set aside, the issue of whether the petitioners are entitled to an injunction prohibiting the respondents from issuing further Notices to End Tenancies to them until further order of the Court is moot.
 The petition is dismissed with costs to the respondents.