IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
|
Citation: |
The Owners, Strata Plan VR 855 v. Shawn Oaks Holdings Ltd., |
|
|
2018 BCSC 1162 |
Date: 20180712
Docket: S1710308
Registry: Vancouver
Between:
The Owners, Strata Plan VR 855
Petitioner
And
Shawn Oaks
Holdings Ltd., Sheri Rempel, Clare Soriano, Shao Huang,
Albert Au, Richard Shypitka, Diane Dominitz, Albert (Chung) Suen,
Titus Chen, Lilliam Klassen, Patricia McCuag, Toby Nadler, Allan Lin,
Jeffrey O’Yek, Chris Hetherington, Breanne Hartley, Cy Mark, Ryan
Sutcliffe, Katie McGuire, Oman Ani, Michal Zencak, Olga Castiblanco,
Angie Salas, Richard Rivera, Ashley Miller, Tracy McCarthy, Tina
Barnett, Filipe Olievera, Vicki Mahar, Sebastian Garcia Romero,
Jordan Rodriguez, Charissa Schamuhn, Branda Beloe, Luboslau
Zencak, Michal Zencak, Catherine Chin-Ha Ma, Morgan Murray, Kelsi
Furlong, Dung Moon Min, Haesum Min, Martin Hintersteininger; John
Doe Tenant; Jane Doe Tenant; and All Tenants and Occupiers of the
Subject Lands and Premises
Respondents
- and -
Docket: S180601
Registry: Vancouver
Between:
Shawn Oaks Holdings Ltd.
Petitioner
And
The Owners, Strata
Plan VR 855
Olga Castiblanco, Angie Salas, Richard Rivera, Tina Barnett, Claire
Keegan, Tracy McCarthy, Daniel Gaulding, Shao Huang,
Albert Cheung Shin Au, Po Sim Au, Sebastian Garcia, Ivan Jordan
Rodriguez, Catherine Chin-Ha Miu, Charissa Schamuhn, Brandon Bebe,
Michael Zancak, Anna Kubulakova, Ashley Demarin Miller-
Bouchard, Filipe Oliveira, Viki Mattar, Morgan Murray, Kelsi
Furlong, Dong Moon Min, Haesuh Min, Luboslav and Michal Zencak,
Anna Kubulakova, Sarah McGuire, Katie McGuire, Ryan Sutcliffe and
Oman Ani
Respondents
Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Norell
Reasons for Judgment
|
Counsel for The Owners, Strata Plan VR 855: |
S. Todesco |
|
Counsel for Shawn Oaks Holdings Ltd.: |
L. Martz C. Gallant |
|
Place and Date of Hearing: |
Vancouver, B.C. April 06, 2018 |
|
Place and Date of Judgment: |
Vancouver, B.C. July 12, 2018 |
[1] There are two petitions before the Court. The Owners, Strata Plan VR 855 (the “Strata Corporation”) manages a 72-unit strata property (the “Property”). Shawn Oaks Holdings Ltd. (“Shawn Oaks”) is a developer which owns strata lots in the Property. The personal respondents are the 27 tenants (the “Tenants”) who rent those strata lots from Shawn Oaks.
[2] In the first petition, the Strata Corporation seeks the following orders:
a) a declaration that Shawn Oaks has rented their strata lots in contravention of bylaw 3 of the Strata Corporation;
b) an order that Shawn Oaks forthwith comply with bylaw 3;
c) in the alternative, an order that all Tenants vacate the premises within 60 days of an order; and
d) an order for judgment in favour of the Strata Corporation against Shawn Oaks for outstanding amounts owing as fines levied for contravention of bylaw 3. The alleged amount owing to June 21, 2017 is $63,575.
[3] The Strata Corporation argues that bylaw 3 prohibits the rental of strata lots and that Shawn Oaks has breached that bylaw by renting to the Tenants. Shawn Oaks responds that bylaw 3 is not a valid bylaw and is not enforceable as it is not compliant with what is permitted under the Strata Property Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 43 [SPA]. In the alternative, if the bylaw is enforceable, it should be interpreted to permit Shawn Oaks to rent because the bylaw mandates occupancy and a corporation can only occupy by renting. In the further alternative, if the bylaw is enforceable, the Strata Corporation has not met the procedural requirements of s. 135 of the SPA to levy fines.
[4] In response, the Strata Corporation argues bylaw 3 is valid, and that Shawn Oaks bought the strata lots knowing of bylaw 3. The bylaw mandates occupancy by the owner or immediate family, does not prohibit vacancy, and a corporation can occupy without renting. Finally, the Strata Corporation says it has met the procedural requirements to levy fines.
[5] In the second petition, Shawn Oaks seeks the following orders if the Court finds that bylaw 3 is enforceable:
a) A declaration pursuant to s. 164 of the SPA that the actions of the Strata Corporation in seeking to enforce bylaw 3 against Shawn Oaks prior to the determination of the ownership of the strata lots currently in issue in BC Supreme Court Action No. S167725 (the “Related Action”) is significantly unfair; and
b) An order directing that the Strata Corporation refrain from seeking to enforce bylaw 3 against Shawn Oaks until the ownership of the strata lots currently in dispute is determined by the Court in the Related Action, or the parties otherwise agree.
[6] Shawn Oaks argues that this dispute is not about rentals, but about something else: it is a proxy for a larger dispute that is connected to the Related Action and the potential redevelopment of the Property and winding up of the Strata Corporation. It is being used “as a tool to delay redevelopment and extract increased purchase prices from Shawn Oaks”. The Strata Corporation responds that it has an obligation to enforce bylaw 3 and nothing it has done is significantly unfair. Any motives which Shawn Oaks alleges, which are in dispute, are irrelevant.
[7] For the reasons following, I am dismissing the Strata Corporation’s petition as I find that bylaw 3.1 of bylaw 3, is not valid as it does not comply with the SPA and is therefore unenforceable. It follows that the fines levied by the Strata Corporation are without authority and pursuant to s. 24 of the Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 253, I relieve Shawn Oaks of any liability for the fines. As I have dismissed the petition of the Strata Corporation, it is not necessary to address the petition of Shawn Oaks and I adjourn it generally.
[8] Evidence was filed and arguments made concerning the history of this dispute. However, the parties agree that the issue of the validity of bylaw 3 is one of statutory and bylaw interpretation. The history is not relevant to this issue, but only to the other orders sought. I therefore will not detail that evidence, but set out below limited background information for two reasons: to set the context in which the dispute came into being and why the parties sought the orders they did; and for the discussion of jurisdiction at the end of these reasons.
[9] The Property was built in the early 1980s and is located on Oak Street near 41st Avenue, in Vancouver, B.C.
[10] Shawn Oaks, together with its associated companies, Landmark Shawn Oaks Development Ltd. (“Landmark”) and Canada Willingdon Holdings Ltd. (“Willingdon”) is in the business of real estate development.
[11] In the fall of 2015 Willingdon identified the Property as a potential redevelopment site. Between December 2015 and August 2016, Willingdon entered into contracts for the purchase of 42 of the 72 strata lots in the Property. Willingdon assigned those contracts to Landmark. Upon completion, Shawn Oaks became the registered owner of the strata lots, as nominee, agent and trustee for Landmark.
[12] Prior to entering into the contracts for purchase and sale of the strata lots, Shawn Oaks was aware of bylaw 3.
[13] In the period of time after Willingdon entered into the contracts for purchase and sale, realtors communicated to owners of strata lots in the Property that higher prices for their strata lots could be obtained than were provided for under the contracts for purchase and sale with Willingdon.
[14] At some point in about this time period, another developer entered into contracts for purchase and sale of 19 other strata lots in the Property. Those sales did not complete for reasons that are not before the Court.
[15] During the June 2016 annual general meeting of the Strata Corporation, an owner of a strata lot – not Shawn Oaks – put forward a motion to amend bylaw 3 to permit rentals. This motion was defeated at a vote.
[16] In July 2016, a number of owners who had entered into contracts for purchase and sale of their strata lots with Willingdon took the position the contracts were unenforceable and void and advised they would not be closing.
[17] In August 2016, Landmark commenced legal proceedings against the non-closing owners in the Related Action.
[18] The remaining owners who had contracts for purchase and sale with Willingdon completed the contracts in August 2016. Since that time, two of the non-closing owners elected to complete the sale of their strata lots. Four other owners have sold their strata lots to Shawn Oaks.
[19] In total, Shawn Oaks is now the registered owner, on behalf of Landmark, of 27 strata lots of the Property, leaving the ownership of 19 strata lots in dispute in the Related Action.
[20] The Related Action is set for trial to commence on April 15, 2019.
[21] Shawn Oaks has rented the strata lots it owns, while planning of the redevelopment of the Property is underway.
[22] In August 2016, Shawn Oaks contacted the property manager of the Strata Corporation and asked that a bylaw amendment resolution repealing bylaw 3 be put to the owners of the Property pursuant to s. 43 of the SPA. On October 5, 2016, a special general meeting was convened and the bylaw amendment resolution was put forward and defeated at a vote.
[23] Commencing October 20, 2016, the Strata Corporation sent notices of infractions regarding bylaw 3 to Shawn Oaks.
[24] Since December 2016, the Strata Corporation has levied fines against Shawn Oaks for alleged breaches of bylaw 3 commencing in August 2016.
[25] To date, Shawn Oaks has not paid the fines levied by the Strata Corporation and Shawn Oaks continues to rent to the Tenants.
[26] Bylaw 3 was originally put in place in 1994 and amended in 2001. The current and applicable version is:
BY-LAW: 3 STRATA LOT OCCUPANCY
3.1 With the exception of those strata lots listed in Section 3.2, all strata lots are to be occupied by the owner, or their immediate family.
For clarity, immediate family, means anyone being 19 years of age, or over, who is a sibling of the husband/wife, or the son/daughter, father/mother, grandparents or grandchildren of the owner of a strata lot.
Before the owner of a strata lot permits a member of their immediate family to occupy the strata lot they shall advise Council, and furnish the name(s) and the relationship of the individual(s) concerned.
Unauthorized renting/leasing, or actions which may be construed as renting/leasing of any strata lot not listed in By-laws 3.2: up to $500 monthly or any portion thereof.
3.2 Subject to the Condominium Act of British Columbia, the number of strata lots within Strata Plan VR855 that may be leased/rented is restricted to 4, namely:
Strata Lot #16 […]
Strata Lot #8 […]
Strata Lot #17 […]
Strata Lot #72 […]
in the City of Vancouver, B.C. V6M 2V5
3.3 Any owner of the strata lots listed in Section 3.2, who leases their lot shall submit a completed Form “K” to the management company within 15 days of commencement of the lease. Failure to comply will incur a fine of $50 monthly or portion thereof.
3.4 Those strata lots, listed in Section 3.2, which are now leased/rented will be permitted to continue to be leased/rented until the sale of such strata lot(s), at which time this permission shall terminate automatically.
3.5 In accordance with By-Law 3.2, owners who are allowed to rent/lease their strata lot must advise their lessees of the existence of the Strata Property Act, By-Laws and the current Rules and Regulations of the Strata Corporation VR855. Upon each leasing or renting of their strata lot, the owner shall be charged a non-refundable [sic] of $50 payable to the Strata Corporation to cover future administration costs to contact the owner and/or the tenant.
[My emphasis.]
[27] The applicable provisions of the SPA are ss. 121, 141 and 142:
s. 121
(1) A bylaw is not enforceable to the extent that it
(a) contravenes this Act, the regulations, the Human Rights Code or any other enactment or law,
…
(c) prohibits or restricts the right of an owner of a strata lot to freely sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise dispose of the strata lot or an interest in the strata lot.
(2) Subsection (1)(c) does not apply to
(a) a bylaw under section 141 that prohibits or limits rentals,
…
s. 141
(1) The strata corporation must not screen tenants, establish screening criteria, require the approval of tenants, require the insertion of terms in tenancy agreements or otherwise restrict the rental of a strata lot except as provided in subsection (2).
(2) The strata corporation may only restrict the rental of a strata lot by a bylaw that
(a) prohibits the rental of residential strata lots, or
(b) limits one or more of the following:
(i) the number or percentage of residential strata lots that may be rented;
(ii) the period of time for which residential strata lots may be rented.
(3) A bylaw under subsection (2)(b)(i) must set out the procedure to be followed by the strata corporation in administering the limit.
s. 142
(1) For the purposes of this section, “family” and “family member” have the meaning set out in the regulations.
(2) A bylaw referred to in section 141(2) does not apply to prevent the rental of a strata lot to a member of the owner’s family.
[My emphasis.]
[28] The Strata Property Regulation, B.C. reg. 43/2000 [Regulations] defines family and family member as follows:
s. 8.1
(1) For the purposes of section 142 of the Act, “family” and “family member” mean
(a) a spouse of the owner,
(b) a parent or child of the owner, or
(c) a parent or child of the spouse of the owner.
(2) In subsection (1), “spouse of the owner” includes an individual who has lived with the owner, for a period of at least 2 years at the relevant time, in a marriage-like relationship.
[29] The words of an enactment should be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme and object of the enactment, and the intention of the legislature: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at para. 21.
[30] It is common ground between the parties that bylaw 3 has the effect of regulating rentals. They differ in whether it does so in a permissible manner.
[31] The only manner in which the Strata Corporation may prohibit or restrict rentals is by complying with s. 141(2) of the SPA. As stated in Mathews v. The Owners, Strata Plan VR 90, 2016 BCCA 345 at para. 42:
In addition, s. 141(1) prohibits a strata corporation from restricting the rental of a strata lot except as provided in subsection (2). As a result, the strata corporation has no right to restrict the rental of a strata lot except by a bylaw that: (a) prohibits the rental of residential strata lots entirely; or (b) limits the number or percentage of residential strata lots that may be rented and/or the period of time for which residential strata lots may be rented.
[32] The Strata Corporation relies specifically upon bylaw 3.1 as the basis for prohibiting rentals. Counsel for the Strata Corporation argues that bylaws 3.2 to 3.5 are spent as they pertain to the four lots listed, as those strata lots were sold previously. He argues bylaws 3.2 to 3.5 likely reflect Rental Disclosure Statements from the original developer, and the bylaws should have been cleaned up when the lots were sold. He states bylaw 3.1 is the applicable bylaw and it comes within s. 141(2)(a) of the SPA. No evidence was filed regarding previous sales of the four strata lots or any Rental Disclosure Statements.
[33] Shawn Oaks relies upon bylaw 3.1 and bylaws 3.2 to 3.5. Counsel for Shawn Oaks argues that the whole of bylaw 3 is unenforceable. She says there is no evidence filed on the petitions that shows bylaws 3.2 to 3.5 are in fact spent, but does acknowledge that two of the four strata lots identified in bylaw 3.2 are now owned by Shawn Oaks. She states that the fact at least two of the strata lots have been sold and are no longer owned by the original owners is irrelevant to whether the bylaw is compliant with the SPA. Counsel for Shawn Oaks therefore makes arguments with respect to bylaws 3.2 to 3.5 as well, and says those bylaws are not in compliance with s. 141(2)(b) of the SPA.
[34] There is not sufficient material filed for me to make the findings of fact necessary to make a determination with respect to whether bylaws 3.2 to 3.5 are spent with respect to the four strata lots, and if not, if they are valid. Given that the Strata Corporation relies only upon bylaw 3.1 as the basis for prohibiting rentals, and my finding that it is not valid, it is not necessary for me to consider bylaws 3.2 to 3.5.
[35] Counsel for the Strata Corporation argues that a reasonable interpretation of the bylaw, taken as a whole, is that rentals are prohibited, and that this is consistent with s. 141(2)(a). He concedes that bylaw 3.1 is “inelegant” and argues it likely was drafted without the benefit of legal advice, but states that anyone reading it would appreciate that it prohibits rentals.
[36] Counsel for the Strata Corporation refers to the October 5, 2016 special general meeting where Shawn Oaks put forward a motion to amend bylaw 3 to permit rentals. He argues that Shawn Oaks knew of bylaw 3 when it purchased strata lots, and must have accepted that a reasonable interpretation of bylaw 3 is that it prohibits rentals because Shawn Oaks asked that it be amended. He argues that the validity of the bylaw was only brought up as a defence to the petition of the Strata Corporation, and not raised previously.
[37] Counsel for Shawn Oaks argues that the bylaw is more than inelegant – it is “non-compliant” with the SPA. The SPA is prescriptive and there is no residual discretion for the Strata Corporation to restrict rentals in any manner other than as permitted under s. 141.
[38] She argues that bylaw 3.1 is an occupancy bylaw. By its title and on its face, bylaw 3.1 does not prohibit or restrict rentals; it mandates occupancy. The requirement that a strata lot be occupied by the owner or immediate family means that a third person who rents the strata lot may not occupy it. Section 141 “permits a bylaw that ‘prohibits the rental of residential strata lots’, not a bylaw that strata lots be ‘occupied by the owner’.”
[39] Counsel for Shawn Oaks argues that because bylaw 3.1 is framed in terms of occupancy, an owner could rent his or her strata lot to anyone so long as the owner continued to also occupy the strata lot. She gives the example of a two bedroom strata lot owned by a person who travels frequently, and who rents the second bedroom to a third person. She says this would not be in compliance with s. 141(2)(a) of the SPA which prohibits all rental except to family members.
[40] Counsel for Shawn Oaks further argues that bylaw 3.1 permits occupancy by a member of the owner’s “immediate family” which is defined in the bylaw. The definition of immediate family is broader than, and therefore inconsistent with, the definition of “family member” in the Regulations, and is thus not in compliance with ss. 141 and 142 of the SPA. The definition of family member in the Regulations is restricted to the spouse, and to the children and parents of the owner and owner’s spouse. The definition of immediate family in bylaw 3.1 is “anyone being 19 years of age, or over, who is a sibling of the husband/wife, or the son/daughter, father/mother, grandparents or grandchildren of the owner of a strata lot”.
[41] Because the bylaw is framed in terms of occupancy, nothing prohibits rental to those who fall within this extended definition of immediate family. This is inconsistent with s. 141(2)(a) which requires a prohibition on all rentals, but which by s. 142 does not apply to defined family members. Counsel gives an example, that under bylaw 3.1, an owner could rent a strata lot to an adult sibling or an adult grandchild.
[42] Further, counsel for Shawn Oaks argues that by permitting rentals to adult siblings of the owner and owner’s spouse, and to grandchildren and grandparents of the owner, the Strata Corporation is engaging is a form of “screening” that is not permitted under s. 141(1) of the SPA.
[43] In response to the argument of the Strata Corporation that Shawn Oaks was aware of bylaw 3, and had tried to have it amended, counsel says that Shawn Oaks had two options – it could start a petition such as this, or seek to amend the bylaw which is what they initially attempted to do. She says there is nothing improper in Shawn Oaks waiting to advance arguments regarding validity until the petition was brought. Shawn Oaks could have raised this previously with the Strata Corporation, but not having done that is not a bar to raising it before the Court.
[44] In reply, counsel for the Strata Corporation argues that the fact that bylaw 3.1 is framed in terms of occupancy as opposed to rental is a distinction without a difference. It is the substance of the bylaw that counts, and taken as a whole, the bylaw prohibits rentals.
[45] With respect to the specific examples given by counsel for Shawn Oaks as to how bylaw 3.1 operates inconsistently with ss. 141and 142, he argues that if one dissects every word, it is possible to come up with multiple possible interpretations, but it is plain on its face that the bylaw prohibits rentals.
[46] With respect to the expanded definition of immediate family in the bylaw, and the inconsistency between that and the definition of family member in the Regulations, counsel for the Strata Corporation argues that the definition of immediate family in bylaw 3.1 is an exception to the prohibition, is less restrictive than required by the SPA, and should therefore be permissible.
[47] The SPA is prescriptive in how a Strata Corporation may prohibit or restrict rentals. Bylaw 3.1 must come within s. 141 or it is unenforceable.
[48] While I agree with counsel for the Strata Corporation that the effect of bylaw 3.1 is to regulate rentals, I do not agree with him that a reasonable interpretation is that it prohibits rentals in compliance with s. 141(2)(a).
[49] In my view, the fact that bylaw 3.1 is framed in terms of occupancy rather than rental is not necessarily fatal to whether it is a valid bylaw. The concern with using the verb “occupy” rather than verb “rent” in the bylaw, is that they are two overlapping, but not necessarily co-existent actions; there can be occupancy with or without rental. I have come to the conclusion that because they are different actions, and because bylaw 3.1 uses an extended definition of immediate family that is not consistent with the Regulations, a plain reading of bylaw 3.1 is that it does not prohibit rentals in compliance with the SPA.
[50] Bylaw 3.1 mandates occupancy by the owner or the owner’s immediate family as that term is defined in the bylaw. By not directly prohibiting all rentals (which would be subject to s. 142 which permits rentals to family members as defined in the Regulations), or by not prohibiting all rentals except to family members as defined in the Regulations (which would adopt the wording of s. 142 and therefore be consistent with the SPA bylaw 3.1 runs afoul of s. 141(2)(a). Bylaw 3.1 does not prohibit rental to those defined immediate family that fall outside the definition of family member in the Regulations. Because the bylaw is framed in terms of occupancy, and not in terms of a prohibition on renting, under bylaw 3.1, an owner could rent to “anyone being 19 years of age, or over, who is a sibling of the husband/wife … [or] grandparents, or grandchildren” of the owner. Bylaw 3.1 therefore permits rentals in a manner inconsistent with s. 141(2)(a) of the SPA. I agree with counsel for the Strata Corporation that this is also, in effect, a form a screening of tenants that is not permitted under s. 141(1) of the SPA.
[51] I do not find it necessary to, and make no finding with respect to the argument of Shawn Oaks that an owner could retain occupancy but “rent” part of a strata lot under bylaw 3.1. Such an argument may depend on the nature of the agreement with the person “renting” part of the strata lot and was not fully argued before me. It exemplifies the difficulty in using occupancy rather than rental as the conduct that is being directly regulated.
[52] I have considered the argument of counsel for the Strata Corporation that the definition of immediate family in bylaw 3.1 expands rather than restricts the rights of an owner over his/her property. The legislature has decided what is permissible. If there is bylaw prohibiting all rentals, the only permitted exceptions are to family members as they are defined in the Regulations.
[53] I find that clause 3.1 of the bylaw is unenforceable because it is not in compliance with ss. 141(1) and 141(2)(a) of the SPA.
[54] At the outset of the hearing of these petitions, I raised with counsel whether the Supreme Court should hear these matters or whether the petitions should be complaints before the Civil Resolution Tribunal (“CRT”). Counsel for the Strata Corporation and counsel for Shawn Oaks both submitted that the appropriate forum was this Court.
[55] Section 189.6 of the SPA requires the Court to dismiss a petition if all matters are within the jurisdiction of the CRT unless the Court finds it is not in the interests of justice and fairness for the CRT to resolve the dispute. Counsel for the Strata Corporation argued that not all of the relief sought was within the jurisdiction of the CRT — specifically the order that the Tenants vacate the strata lots — and therefore s. 189.6 of the SPA was not engaged. He argued such an order affects an interest in land and the CRT does not have jurisdiction to do so. Given my findings that follow on fairness and justice, it was not necessary to decide the extent of the CRT’s jurisdiction.
[56] Referring to the factors a court may consider under s. 189.6(2) of the SPA, counsel argued that their clients both consented to and wanted the petitions heard in the Supreme Court. They argued this was beyond the intended scope of the CRT and not a dispute between a single owner or owners and a strata corporation where there was a complaint about a rental that was interfering with the day-to-day use and enjoyment of property. They argued this is a complex dispute between a developer and Strata Corporation in the context of the potential redevelopment and future winding up of a strata corporation. Further, counsel argued that the 2016 amendments to the SPA relaxing the threshold requirements for voluntary winding up of corporations, along with increasing property values, have created increased activity by developers. Rather than obtaining the agreement of all owners to wind up, developers are purchasing enough units to control votes. Counsel argued there would be benefit from a decision by the Supreme Court on the issues raised. Although ultimately I did not find it necessary to decide those issues, they were argued before me. Concern was also expressed regarding how the CRT process would accommodate another 27 potential parties if they had chosen to appear.
[57] I agree that this is not the typical situation where the CRT dispute resolution process is being used to mediate, and ultimately rule if necessary on a dispute, so that present and future life at the strata property can continue in a harmonious manner. In Yas v. Pope, 2018 BCSC 282 this Court considered whether it was in the interests of justice and fairness for the CRT to continue to have jurisdiction over a dispute. In that case, there was a dispute between two owners, one living above the other, concerning noise from hardwood floors. The Court found that the dispute should stay at the CRT. I consider the dispute in that case significantly different than the dispute in this case.
[58] Considering the totality of the factors argued, I find that in the circumstances of these petitions, it is not in the interests of justice and fairness for the CRT to resolve the dispute.
“Norell J.”