IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
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Citation: |
Mishra v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), |
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2018 BCSC 52 |
Date: 20180116
Docket: S158626
Registry: Vancouver
Between:
Sunil Kumar Mishra
Petitioner
And
The Superintendent of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Winteringham
Reasons for Judgment
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Counsel for the Petitioner: |
K. Lee |
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Counsel for the Respondent: |
J. Biem |
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Place and Date of Hearing: |
Vancouver, B.C. September 22, 2017 |
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Place and Date of Judgment: |
Vancouver, B.C. January 16, 2018 |
[1] On July 10, 2015, a peace officer, Constable Davies, issued a 90-day Notice of Driving Prohibition (the "Notice") to the petitioner, Sunil Kumar Mishra, pursuant to s. 215.41 of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 318 (the "MVA"). Cst. Davies issued the Notice on the basis that the petitioner had failed or refused, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample for analysis.
[2] On July 14, 2015, the petitioner applied to the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles (the "Superintendent") pursuant to s. 215.48 of the MVA for a written review of Cst. Davies’ decision to issue the Notice. The sole ground raised by the petitioner to the Superintendent was whether he had a reasonable excuse for refusing to comply with the demand for a breath sample.
[3] On July 29, 2015, a delegate of the Superintendent, issued the decision confirming the validity of the Notice.
[4] The petitioner applies pursuant to s. 2 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 241 for orders quashing the Immediate Roadside Prohibition (“IRP”) and corresponding monetary penalty/vehicle impoundment and setting aside the adjudicator’s decision.
[5] In this court, the petitioner does not challenge the adjudicator’s findings regarding the petitioner’s failure or refusal to comply with the demand. Rather, the petitioner submits that the adjudicator made an unreasonable decision in finding the petitioner was a driver as defined in the MVA. Specifically, the ground for judicial review is that the evidence before the adjudicator revealed that the petitioner was “in custody of the police and not in care and control” of the motor vehicle when Cst. Davies arrived at the scene. As such, the petitioner submits, there was no evidence before the adjudicator to support the finding that the petitioner was a driver within the meaning of the MVA and that the adjudicator erred in making that finding.
[6] The respondent takes the position that the adjudicator’s decision is reasonable because there was evidence in the record (including an admission by the petitioner that he was the driver) accepted by the adjudicator and that the adjudicator’s finding was amply supported by the evidence presented.
[7] The evidence before the adjudicator included the following:
a) Immediate Roadside Prohibition - Application for Review dated July 14, 2015;
b) Notice of Driving Prohibition;
c) Report to Superintendent - Immediate Roadside Prohibition (“Report to Superintendent”);
d) Vancouver Police Department General Occurrence Report – Narrative of Cst. Davies dated July 10, 2015 (“Occurrence Report”); and
e) Letter from petitioner.
[8] In the Occurrence Report, Cst. Davies described the following circumstances relevant to the petition:
a) The petitioner was driving southbound in the 400 block of Carrall St., Vancouver, at approximately 0055 hours when a pedestrian crossed the road in front of him.
b) The petitioner was unable to stop his vehicle and struck the pedestrian.
c) According to a witness, the petitioner was traveling approximately 30-40 km/hour at the time of impact.
d) According to a second witness, the petitioner exited his vehicle to check on the pedestrian and then returned to his vehicle.
e) The second witness indicated the petitioner then tried to drive away but he prevented him from doing so by standing in front of the petitioner’s car.
f) Others then took steps to remove the petitioner from his vehicle.
g) Cst. Glanville was the first police officer who attended at the scene.
h) At approximately 0120 hours, Cst. Davies arrived at the scene and thereafter dealt with the petitioner.
i) Cst. Davies demanded a breath sample and described the circumstances relating to the petitioner’s refusal to provide a breath sample.
[9] Cst. Davies, in the Report to Superintendent, recorded the time of “driving or care or control” to be 0120 hours which corresponded with the time of his arrival. In the Report to Superintendent, Cst. Davies was required to explain the basis for establishing that the petitioner was the driver or had care or control of the vehicle. In response, Cst. Davies checked two boxes on the pre-printed form: that this was “witnessed by officer” and through an “independent witness”.
[10] As stated above, the petitioner raised one issue for the adjudicator’s consideration in the application for review. The petitioner submitted: “I had a reasonable excuse for refusing or failing to comply with the officer’s demand”. The petitioner relied on a letter explaining the reasons for his refusal:
To whom it may concern;
My refusal to take the breathalyzer rests on two issues:
The first, based on the action of the police, the second would be on my cultural upbringing.
First point, the man that came into contact with my car was j-walking; between two clearly marked crosswalks.
The police did not charge him with j-walking, nor asked him to take a breathalyzer. My car suffered no scrapes or marks on impact, if there was one, it must have been minimal.
Second point, if the j-walker was not asked to take a test, why should I be? My Fijian culture has taught me not to trust the police. The above action can only enforce such belief.
[11] In the hearing before me, the petitioner admits he was the driver of the vehicle when he struck the pedestrian. However, the petitioner said the Report to Superintendent was inaccurate and needed to state 0055 hours and this error, despite the petitioner’s admission, is fatal to the adjudicator’s decision. The petitioner says the adjudicator unreasonably concluded that he had care or control of the vehicle at 0120 hours.
[12] The adjudicator found the petitioner was a driver within the meaning of s. 215.41(1); that the officer made a proper demand to provide a breath sample; and that the petitioner failed to comply with the officer's demand without reasonable excuse.
[13] The adjudicator rejected the petitioner's submissions which could be characterized as a challenge to the reasonableness of the peace officer’s demand for a breath sample. The adjudicator addressed the issues on review in this way:
Section 215.5(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act requires me to confirm your prohibition, along with the corresponding monetary penalty and vehicle impoundment, if I am satisfied that:
· You were the driver within the meaning of section 215.41(1);
· You failed or refused to comply with a demand made under the Criminal Code to provide a sample of breath for analysis by means of an approved screening device; and
· You did not have a reasonable excuse for failing or refusing to comply with a demand.
. . .
In reaching my decision on this review, I must consider all relevant information provided to me.
…
You applied for this review under one ground. For your benefit, I have considered all of the grounds available to you in this review.
. . .
In your written submission, you state that you question the actions of police and why they did not ask the person who was caught j-walking in front of your car to take a breathalyzer as well. I acknowledge this statement; however, I am only able to make determinations on issues listed in section 215.5 of the Act.
[14] In finding that the petitioner was a driver within the meaning of s. 215.41(1) of the MVA, the adjudicator reasoned as follows:
The officer’s evidence includes a Report to Superintendent which indicates that at 0120 hours on July 10, 2015, he observed you driving or having care or control of the vehicle;
In your written submission, you refer to an accident which occurred with a j-walker when you were driving your vehicle.
Based on the evidence before me, I am satisfied that you were a driver within the section of s. 215.41(1) of the Act.
[15] In deciding whether the petitioner failed or refused to comply with the demand, the adjudicator noted that he was required to determine whether the peace officer made a valid demand, whether the petitioner failed or refused to comply with that demand and whether he intended to produce that failure or refusal.
[16] The adjudicator considered whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the petitioner had alcohol in his body and noted the officer's evidence that the petitioner had an odour of alcohol on his breath and that there was no evidence presented to the contrary. As such, the adjudicator was satisfied that Cst. Davies had made a valid ASD demand.
[17] The adjudicator then turned to the issue of whether the petitioner had refused to provide a breath sample and was satisfied that the petitioner’s evidence established that he had refused:
In your written submission, you state that if the j-walker was not asked to take the breath test, then why should you have been. However, I find it important to note that there are no provisions within the Act which enable the police to issue a breath demand to a pedestrian. This portion of the Act only applies to people who are driving or in care or control of a motor vehicle. Further, your statement indicates that you do not feel you should have been required to provide a breath sample. This indicates to me that you intended to fail or refuse to provide a breath sample.
[18] On the issue of whether the petitioner had a reasonable excuse, the adjudicator stated:
I acknowledge that you did not think you had to provide a breath sample because the pedestrian you hit with your vehicle did not have to provide one. However, I am not satisfied that this represents a reasonable excuse to fail or refuse to comply with the ASD demand.
[19] From the passages reproduced above, it is clear the adjudicator focused on the issue raised on the review (that the petitioner had a reasonable excuse for refusing to provide a breath sample). Similarly, it is clear that the adjudicator relied on the petitioner’s admission and the officer’s evidence to form the basis for the finding that the petitioner was a driver within the meaning of the MVA.
[20] The IRP regime is governed by s. 215.41 and s. 215.51 of the MVA. The parties agree that the legislative scheme applicable to the petitioner is the one in force to the end of March 2016. What follows is a brief overview of the legislative scheme in force at the pertinent time.
[21] Under s. 215.41(1), “driver” is defined to include a person having the care or control of a motor vehicle on a highway or industrial road whether or not the motor vehicle is in motion.
[22] Section 215.41(4) provides:
(4) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a driver failed or refused, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a demand made under the Criminal Code to provide a sample of breath for analysis by means of an approved screening device, the peace officer, or another peace officer, must take those actions described in subsection (3.1) (c) and (d) [take possession of the driver's licence, and serve on the driver a Notice of Driving Prohibition].
[23] Under s. 215.43(2.1)(b), a person served with a Notice of Driving Prohibition for refusal or failure to comply with a demand is prohibited from driving for a period of 90 days.
[24] Section 215.47 provides that upon service of the Notice, the peace officer must forward to RoadSafetyBC various documents, including:
(a) the driver’s licence;
(b) a copy of the Notice;
(c) a certificate of service;
(d) a report in the form established by the Superintendent sworn or solemnly affirmed by the peace officer; and
(e) information relating to the calibration of the approved screening device on the basis which the Notice was served, if applicable.
[25] Under s. 215.48, the driver may, within seven days of being served with the Notice, apply to the Superintendent for a review, which may be written or oral. An oral hearing is not required unless requested by a person served with a Notice of Driving Prohibition for 30 to 90 days. The driver may submit any statements or other evidence he wishes the Superintendent to consider.
[26] Section 215.49(1) requires that on review of a driving prohibition under s. 215.48, the Superintendent must consider:
(a) any relevant written statements or evidence submitted by the applicant;
(b) the report of the peace officer forwarded under s. 215.47(d);
(c) a copy of the Notice of Driving Prohibition;
(d) any other relevant documents and information forwarded to the superintendent by the peace officer who served the Notice of Driving Prohibition or any other peace officer, including peace officer’s reports that have not been sworn or solemnly affirmed;
(e) in the case of an oral hearing, any relevant evidence given or representations made at the hearing; and
(f) in the case of a second or subsequent prohibition, as described in s. 215.43(4) and (5), the person’s driving record.
[27] Section 215.49(2) provides that in a review under s. 215.48, no person may be cross-examined. The superintendent also has a broad discretion to determine the weight to be given to any document or other information referred to in s. 215.49(1), including any document or information that is not sworn or affirmed: s. 215.49(4).
[28] Under s. 215.5(1)(c), in the case of a 90-day prohibition issued as a result of a failure or refusal to comply with a demand, if the superintendent is satisfied that the person was a 'driver' within the meaning of the MVA, and failed or refused without reasonable excuse to comply with the demand for a sample, then the Superintendent must confirm the prohibition, monetary penalty and vehicle impoundment.
[29] At the time relevant to this Petition, the legislation provided that the officer bears the onus of proof, and must satisfy the Superintendent, on a balance of probabilities, that the prohibition is justified: Pan v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2012 BCSC 1766 at para. 6.
[30] Section 215.5(4)(c) provides that if the Superintendent is not so satisfied, he must revoke the prohibition and cancel the monetary penalty.
[31] In Wilson v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 47, the Supreme Court of Canada reiterated the importance of roadside driving prohibitions as a tool to promote public safety. Most notably, Justice Moldaver stated:
[33] … it has long been recognized that regulatory legislation, such as the MVA, differs from criminal legislation in the way it balances individual liberties against the protection of the public. Under regulatory legislation, the public good often takes on greater weight. In R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154, at p. 219, this Court held that
[r]egulatory legislation involves a shift of emphasis from the protection of individual interests and the deterrence and punishment of acts involving moral fault to the protection of public and societal interests. While criminal offences are usually designed to condemn and punish past, inherently wrongful conduct, regulatory measures are generally directed to the prevention of future harm through the enforcement of minimum standards of conduct and care.
[34] These comments are particularly apt in the case of regulatory legislation involving roadside driving prohibitions: R. v. Gordon, 2002 BCCA 224, 100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 35, at paras. 26-27. Roadside driving prohibitions are a tool to promote public safety. As such, the legislation necessarily places greater weight on this goal. Unlike the criminal law regime, persons who register a “Warn” or “Fail” under the regulatory regime do not end up with a criminal record, nor are they exposed to the more onerous sanctions under the criminal law, including the risk of incarceration. In short, regulatory legislation does not share the same purpose as the criminal law, and it would be a mistake to interpret it as though it did. …
[32] The important objectives of the statutory scheme, however, do not diminish the court’s duty on judicial review to ensure that the Superintendent’s delegate acted within his jurisdiction, did not deny the petitioner a fair hearing and did not render a decision that failed to meet the applicable standard of review.
[33] With respect to the issue presented here, the parties agree the standard for judicial review of the adjudicator’s decision confirming the roadside driving prohibition is reasonableness: Nagra v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2010 BCCA 154; Kenyon v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 BCCA 485 at para. 44; and Wilson at para. 17.
[34] In Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, Justices Bastarache and LeBel for the majority, described the reasonableness standard at para. 47:
[47] Reasonableness is a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the development of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.
[35] At para. 48, the Court explained the deference to be afforded to administrative tribunals by courts applying the reasonableness standard of review:
… What does deference mean in this context? Deference is both an attitude of the court and a requirement of the law of judicial review. It does not mean that courts are subservient to the determinations of decision makers, or that courts must show blind reverence to their interpretations, or that they may be content to pay lip service to the concept of reasonableness review while in fact imposing their own view. Rather, deference imports respect for the decision-making process of adjudicative bodies with regard to both the facts and the law. The notion of deference "is rooted in part in a respect for governmental decisions to create administrative bodies with delegated powers" (Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, at p. 596, per L'Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting). We agree with David Dyzenhaus where he states that the concept of "deference as respect" requires of the courts "not submission but a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a decision": "The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy", in M. Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law (1997), 279, at p. 286 (quoted with approval in Baker, at para. 65, per L'Heureux-Dubé J.; Ryan, at para. 49).
[36] In addition to the principles enunciated in Dunsmuir, much has been written about the reasonableness standard in the context of immediate roadside and administrative driving prohibitions. I mention just three of those decisions now.
[37] Judicial review judges should read the reasons of the adjudicator as a whole in order to assess whether the reasoning is so lacking in logic, or is otherwise flawed, that it renders the decision unreasonable despite the fact there is some evidence to support a conclusion that the decision "falls within a range of acceptable outcomes": Kenyon at para. 53.
[38] In Scott v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2013 BCCA 554 at para. 31, the Court stated that while in general terms, it is correct to state that an adjudicator's decision will be regarded as reasonable if there is some evidence upon which the adjudicator's finding could reasonably be made, that will not be the case where the adjudicator's reasoning process is manifestly flawed. The court referred to Whyte v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2013 BCCA 454 where Harris J.A. said the following:
[11] As it appears to me, the judge quite properly recognized that the adjudicator is entitled to make findings of fact, provided they are reasonably supportable by some evidence in the record. Those findings include making credibility findings, even on the basis of a written record. A court will not interfere unless those findings are unreasonable. But a court is entitled to interfere if the route to a decision is demonstrably unreasonable, even where the ultimate findings might be capable of being supported by the record.
[39] In each case, judicial review is based on the record before the adjudicator. Even where there is some evidence to support a conclusion that the decision falls within a range of acceptable outcomes, the court should read the adjudicator's reasons as a whole to determine whether the decision was rendered unreasonable by a flaw in the reasoning that is central to the conclusion.
[40] Bearing these principles in mind, I turn to the ground raised here for judicial review.
[41] The petitioner contends the adjudicator unreasonably found the petitioner to be the driver at the time indicated in the Notice. The petitioner framed the issue in this way. He said “this was a case in which no evidence was provided by the petitioner on the issue of whether he was a driver. The only evidence pertaining to the time of driving was that provided by the police. The adjudicator therefore needed to be satisfied on the basis of the officer’s evidence that the time of driving was reliable”.
[42] In his written submission, the petitioner somewhat restated the issue:
There was no dispute in the evidence or on the face of the evidence that the Petitioner had been driving the vehicle when the accident occurred. Indeed, the Petitioner had admitted this in his submission and provided an explanation for how the accident had occurred. In this regard, the evidence was unambiguous. The Petitioner was the driver. However, the conclusion drawn by the adjudicator that he was a driver as that term is defined in section 215.41(1) was neither reasonable nor supportable by any evidence before the tribunal.
[43] The petitioner contends that even though the adjudicator was provided with an admission from the petitioner that he was the driver when he struck the pedestrian, that in and of itself is not sufficient. Rather, the petitioner submits, “if an officer has no evidence of when driving occurred or the evidence of the time of driving is unreliable, then the prohibition cannot be issued. In circumstances where the time of driving is not reliable, the adjudicator cannot confirm the prohibition as he or she cannot be satisfied the person was a driver”.
[44] The petitioner says that this submission is supported by the case law that recognizes the significance of establishing the time of driving in impaired driving cases generally and roadside prohibition decisions specifically.
[45] I turn to those authorities now.
[46] The petitioner relies on Weldon v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), unreported, Vancouver Registry No. S1610754 (July 4, 2017) where, at paragraph 11, the learned chambers judge stated the following with respect to the IRP regime:
. . . This regime demands a much tighter temporal connection with the driving, which heightens the need for specificity in terms of the finding as to the time the driving occurred.
[47] Importantly, Weldon dealt with a review of an adjudicator’s decision regarding an administrative driving prohibition and not the legislative regime applicable to this immediate roadside driving prohibition. The learned chamber judge’s analysis regarding time of driving should be considered in that context.
[48] Next, the petitioner contends that the decision of Sutherland v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2017 BCSC 263 should be approached with caution because the learned chambers judge did not consider the definition of driver as provided in the MVA. I disagree with the petitioner that the learned chambers judge failed to deal with the statutory definition of driver in her reasons. Rather, on review of Sutherland on this issue, the learned chambers judge identified that the police officer had made a mistake about the time of driving but found nonetheless the adjudicator’s finding that there was other evidence to support a finding that the petitioner was the driver fell “within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”.
[49] Both counsel referred to Gauder v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2016 BCSC 142. This was also a case where the police responded to a report of a motor vehicle accident and the police could not provide first-hand evidence about the time of the driving or care or control of the vehicle. Although the petitioner was successful on another ground, Justice Pearlman dismissed the ground for judicial review dealing with the reasonableness of the adjudicator’s finding that the petitioner was the driver within the meaning of the statute. Justice Pearlman stated under the legislative scheme it was open to the adjudicator to accept the officer’s evidence of his investigation, including the hearsay evidence he obtained upon his attendance at the scene of the accident.
[50] At paragraphs 54 and 55, Justice Pearlman described circumstances similar to those presented here:
[54] In his report to the Superintendent, the officer noted the time the petitioner was driving or had care and control of the vehicle as 1149. He recorded the time he formed his suspicion as 1205, and the time of his demand as 1214. In the Notice, the officer gave 1214 as the time the petitioner had the care and control of a motor vehicle.
[55] The adjudicator considered the petitioner's statement that she did not operate a vehicle while impaired by alcohol and each of the submissions of her counsel in support of his argument that there was no reliable evidence of the time of driving. The adjudicator addressed the discrepancy between the officer's report and the Notice. He referred to the evidence that the petitioner had been observed by a witness from the time of the accident until the officer arrived. In my view, it was open to the adjudicator to draw the inference that the officer erroneously recorded the time of 1214 in the Notice, and that the correct driving time was 1149 as stated in the report.
[51] Justice Pearlman concluded at para. 57 that there was evidence, accepted by the adjudicator, capable of supporting his finding that the petitioner was a driver within the meaning of section 215.41(1) and “there was no demonstrably or manifestly unreasonable flaw in the reasoning by which the adjudicator reached that conclusion”.
[52] In Semeniuk v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2017 BCSC 834, Justice Pearlman addressed the issue of time of driving and provided a helpful overview, at paragraphs 38 through 56, of the recent cases where the issue was raised particularly in the context of administrative driving prohibitions. I have considered this overview and the authorities cited therein. What can be taken from those cases, relevant to the analysis here, is the need for the adjudicator to ensure that the evidence provides a nexus or link between the observations of others and the time recorded by the police officer, particularly in circumstances where the police officer may not have observed first-hand the driving or care or control.
[53] I turn now to whether on the whole of the evidence adduced in this case, the adjudicator's finding that the petitioner was a driver within the meaning of the MVA was reasonable.
[54] In my view, this was not a case where the adjudicator assessed the police evidence as though it bore a baseline of reliability, assumed facts favourable to the police, or drew inferences for which there was no sufficient evidentiary foundation. Rather, the adjudicator had before him the Occurrence Report, Report to Superintendent and the petitioner’s letter. I am satisfied that there was a link between the time of driving indicated in the Report to Superintendent (and which formed the basis for the adjudicator’s finding) and the evidence presented in the Occurrence Report.
[55] Because the officer responded to a report of a motor vehicle accident he was unable to provide first-hand evidence concerning the petitioner’s driving at the time the pedestrian was struck. Here, under the legislative scheme it was open to the adjudicator to accept the officer's evidence of his investigation, including the hearsay evidence he obtained upon his attendance at the scene of the accident and as documented in the Occurrence Report.
[56] Before the adjudicator there was evidence supporting the adjudicator’s finding that the petitioner was in care or control of the motor vehicle after the pedestrian was struck (at approximately 0055 hours).
[57] Importantly, the driving or care or control did not stop at 0055 hours (as the petitioner suggests in his submission) and the Occurrence Report clearly sets this out. In the Occurrence Report, 0120 hours was the time Cst. Davies arrived at the scene and began dealing with the petitioner. There was evidence before the adjudicator demonstrating a nexus between the finding of fact (that the petitioner was the driver or in care or control) at 0120 hours and the time the pedestrian was struck because the Occurrence Report detailed a series of events allowing such an inference to be drawn.
[58] In particular, Cst. Davies referred to Cst. Glanville’s involvement and to others (which he is entitled to do) wherein he described a series of events involving the petitioner that culminated with witnesses removing the petitioner from his vehicle.
[59] As counsel for the respondent submits, it was open to the adjudicator to make reasonable findings based on the evidence provided by the police, where that evidence was not contradicted by any other evidence on the record. That is not to say the petitioner bore any burden on the review. He did not.
[60] Nonetheless, in my view, the adjudicator’s finding that the petitioner was a driver within the meaning of the MVA fell within the range of acceptable and defensible outcomes and was not manifestly flawed.
[61] In the circumstances presented here, I find there was evidence, accepted by the adjudicator, capable of supporting the finding that the petitioner was a driver within the meaning of s. 215.41(1). There was no demonstrably or manifestly unreasonable flaw in the reasoning by which the adjudicator reached that conclusion.
[62] The petition of Mr. Mishra for judicial review of the decision of the adjudicator dated July 29, 2017 confirming the petitioner’s administrative driving prohibition is dismissed.
“Winteringham J.”